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Abstract: 
The relationship between international linkages and the nature and survival 
of political regimes has gained increasing attention in recent years, but 
remains one that is poorly understood. In this article, we make three 
central contributions to our understanding of international linkage politics 
and autocratic regime survival. First, we introduce and develop the concept 
of ‘autocratic linkage’, and highlight its importance for understanding the 
international politics of autocratic survival. Second, we use event history 
analysis to demonstrate that autocratic linkage has a systematic effect on 
the duration of authoritarian regimes. Finally, we complement our 
quantitative analysis with a focused comparison of autocratic linkage 
politics in the Middle East. We show that variation in Saudi Arabian support 
for autocratic incumbents in the wake of the Arab Spring protests can be 
explained in significant part by variation in linkage relationships. 
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TIES TO THE REST:  
AUTOCRATIC LINKAGES AND REGIME SURVIVAL 
 
Introduction 
In late January 2016, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Iran. He was one of the 
first world leaders to do so after the international sanction had been lifted. During his 
two-day stay, he and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani signed seventeen agreements, 
among them a commitment to raise trade volumes between the two countries to 600 
billion US-dollars. According to Rouhani, they also discussed “science, modern 
technology, culture, tourism, […] security and defence issues” (BBC, 2016). Such 
diverse ties between two autocratic regimes in various socio-political spheres 
constitute what we call international autocratic linkage. In this article, we investigate 
whether and how international autocratic linkages contribute to the survival of 
autocratic regimes.  
The relationship between international linkages and the nature and survival of 
political regimes has gained increasing attention in recent years, but remains one that 
is poorly understood. International linkages are cross-border ties between countries 
across a variety of political, economic, and/or social dimensions, and some have 
argued that they can have strong democratising effects by raising the international 
costs of repression and strengthening democratic actors at the local level (Levitsky & 
Way, 2010, pp. 43–44). Others, however, have suggested that certain forms of 
international linkages can protect and embolden autocratic elites and reduce the 
political space for democratic openings (Cameron & Orenstein, 2012; Tolstrup, 2013; 
Vanderhill, 2013). Close ties to countries like Russia and Iran can serve to facilitate 
authoritarian stability by shielding incumbent autocrats from democratising pressures 
and providing lifelines of diplomatic and material support. To date, however, this 
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 2 
literature has been limited by a selective focus on a limited set of international 
networks and the absence of systematic empirical analysis of linkage politics across 
time and space.  
In this article, we seek to enhance our understanding of international linkage 
politics and autocratic regime survival in three principal ways. First, we focus on ties 
to the rest, rather than ties to the West. We introduce and develop the concept of 
‘autocratic linkage’ – that is, linkages between autocratic states – and highlight its 
importance for understanding the international politics of autocratic survival. We 
measure autocratic linkage on four dimensions – trade, migration, diplomatic ties, and 
geographic proximity – and find that in recent years, autocratic regimes have closed 
ranks on the international level, a trend that does not bode well for democratic 
development.  
Second, we test the effect of autocratic linkage on the survival of 338 autocratic 
regimes between 1949 and 2008 using techniques of event history analysis, and 
demonstrate that autocratic linkage has a systematic effect on the duration of 
authoritarian regimes. In particular, we show that the higher the levels of autocratic 
linkages, the lower the risk of autocratic breakdown and the longer autocratic regimes 
are likely to survive. We argue that this is due to the fact that high levels of autocratic 
linkage give both international and domestic actors a stake in the status quo regime, 
and both sets of actors have incentives to maintain the status quo. Democratic and 
autocratic linkage are not equal in this respect, and we tease out the ways in which 
autocratic linkage creates particular incentive structures that favour authoritarian 
stability.  
 Third, we examine one important mechanism of autocratic linkage with a focused 
comparison of autocratic linkage politics in the Middle East. We trace Saudi Arabia’s 
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 3 
policies towards beleaguered Arab regimes during the Arab Spring, and demonstrate 
that autocratic linkage helps explain variation in Saudi support to regime incumbents 
(while also taking into account that this support was not always successful).  
The article proceeds in five sections. First, we review existing treatments of 
linkage politics and introduce our concept of ‘autocratic linkage’. Second, we outline 
the ways in which autocratic linkage has implications for autocratic survival. Third, 
we identify trends over time in patterns of both democratic and autocratic linkage, and 
reveal a recent surge in autocratic linkage. Fourth, using survival analysis we examine 
the relationship between autocratic linkage and autocratic survival. Finally, we test 
one particular mechanism of the effects of autocratic linkage, demonstrating that 
regimes with close linkages to Saudi Arabia were more likely to receive support from 
the kingdom during the Arab Spring.  
 
International Politics, Autocratic Linkage, and Authoritarian Rule  
In recent years the international sources of authoritarian stability have been the 
subject of increased scrutiny (Bader, 2015; Escriba-Folch & Wright, 2015; Tansey, 
2016; Vanderhill, 2013). Much of this work has focused on the role that individual 
states (so-called ‘Black Knights’) play in sponsoring autocratic regimes abroad, 
including both authoritarian powers such as Russia and China as well as democracies 
such as the United States (Bader, 2015; Brownlee, 2012; Burnell & Schlumberger, 
2010; Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 41; Tolstrup, 2015). However, scholars have also 
focused on the various forms of cross-border ties that can contribute to regime 
survival in more indirect ways. The literature on diffusion has shown that the 
prospects of authoritarian breakdown depend in part on the international context 
within which a regime is situated, including regional levels of democracy and 
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 4 
neighbour regime transitions (Beissinger, 2007; Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Gleditsch 
& Ward, 2006; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). Yet the diffusion literature rarely examines 
cross-border relationships directly, focusing instead on the characteristics of regimes 
across a given region. Elsewhere, studies of specific inter-regime connections have 
focused on isolated sets of relationships, such as the role of trade (Manger & Pickup, 
2016; Ulfelder, 2008), alliances relationships (Boix, 2011; Boix & Svolik, 2013), and 
common membership of international organizations (Pevehouse, 2005; Vachudova, 
2005). The preponderance of empirical findings from these studies have suggested 
that international linkages can create opportunities for democratic openings and thus 
act as a threat to authoritarian stability.  
Recently, Levitsky and Way have sought to consolidate much of this literature 
within an analytical framework emphasising two key international-level variables: 
western leverage and linkage to the West (Levitsky & Way, 2010).  While leverage 
concerns the vulnerability of a particular state to Western pressure, linkage concerns 
the density of ties and cross-border flows between particular countries and Western 
states and international organizations. According to Levitsky and Way, linkage to the 
West acts as a transmitter of international influence, and contributes to 
democratization by heightening the international reverberation of non-democratic 
behaviour, creating domestic constituencies for ‘democratic norm-abiding behaviour’ 
and strengthening democratic opposition forces at the expense of autocratic leaders 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010, pp. 38–54). Leverage has limited impact in the absence of 
linkage. 
More recently, several scholars have identified the need to consider how linkages 
can tie regimes to foreign powers in ways that are more likely to reinforce rather than 
undermine authoritarian rule at the domestic level. Brownlee’s work on the long-
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 5 
standing ties between the US and Egypt starkly highlights the ways in which linkage 
to Western states can help strengthen rather than weaken authoritarian rulers 
(Brownlee, 2012). Vanderhill places international linkages at the heart of her recent 
study of ‘authoritarianism promotion’, arguing that linkages to authoritarian states can 
make the external promotion of authoritarianism more effective (Vanderhill, 2013). 
Tolstrup has rightly criticised a Western bias in much of the literature on the 
international politics of regime change, and identified the ways in which linkages to 
Russia have helped autocratic elites, and harmed democratic ones, in several Eastern 
European states (Tolstrup, 2013). Several other studies also point to the role that 
international linkages to major authoritarian powers can play in bolstering autocratic 
incumbents (Ambrosio, 2009; Bader, 2015; Cameron & Orenstein, 2012). 
Scholars have thus increasingly focused on the ways in which linkage politics can 
contribute to authoritarian stability. Yet our understanding of these dynamics remains 
incomplete, and the current literature exhibits a number of conceptual, theoretical and 
empirical limitations. First, existing conceptions of cross-border linkages have either 
been too restricted or too ad hoc. Insights about cross-national ties often relate only to 
ties between a handful of selected countries, often involving major powers such as the 
US, Russia and China. There is little work that explores linkage globally, and that 
empirically traces changes in global linkage over time. As a result, while we have a 
good understanding of how some forms of linkage matter for regime change and 
regime survival, we do not have a complete picture of the range of international (and 
often competing) linkage politics at work. Second, although existing work on linkage 
rests on some excellent case analyses, there is very little cross-national quantitative 
work that would complement the qualitative findings and facilitate the global analysis 
that is needed.  
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We overcome some of these limitations by conceptualising ‘autocratic linkages’ as 
distinct from linkage to the West or democratic linkages, and we systematically 
examine the nature and effects of autocratic linkage over time and throughout the 
world. Autocratic linkage can be conceived of in similar ways to linkage to the West, 
as the density of ties and cross-border flows between non-democratic regimes. Just as 
with linkage to the West, autocratic linkage is multi-dimensional and captures a range 
of connections between states, including economic and social connections and cross-
border flows of communication and people (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 43).  
 
Autocratic Linkage and Regime Survival  
We argue that autocratic linkages have important implications for the survival of 
authoritarian regimes because they foster preferences for status quo politics both 
among international partners and domestic constituencies. Although linkage with both 
democratic and autocratic regimes abroad may at times work to bolster autocratic 
regimes, we argue that autocratic linkage has distinct and powerful effects that 
democratic linkage does not. We identify four principal causal mechanisms that link 
autocratic linkage to autocratic survival.  
One channel of linkage influence works through domestic constituencies. Levitsky 
and Way argue that linkage to the West provides a range of domestic actors with 
‘personal, financial and professional’ ties to West, and that such actors will have a 
strong interest in avoiding international isolation and sanction from Western 
democracies (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 47). Yet autocratic linkage may provide 
correspondingly strong incentives among domestic actors to maintain the status quo 
and avoid any change of regime that would threaten existing foreign ties. 
Authoritarian leaders often secure the support of key constituencies, such as the 
Page 6 of 87
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 7 
military and business leaders, through patronage and financial largesse (Gandhi & 
Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 2006). Where state revenues depend in significant part 
on international autocratic linkages, any regime change could put patronage-based 
benefits at risk. New incumbents may wish to rely on the same constituencies that 
underwrote the previous regime, but their capacity to do so is lessened if external 
partners shun them and squeeze their external revenue. Saudi aid to Egypt, for 
example, declined sharply after the election of Mohamed Morsi in 2012, who was 
viewed with antipathy in Riyadh.  
Autocratic linkages also influence patterns of international democracy 
enforcement. According to Levitsky and Way, during times of contentious politics 
linkage to the West increases the probability that Western states will both notice and 
take action against government abuses of power during these crisis moments 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 45). Yet autocratic linkage is unlikely to have such effects 
as democracy is rarely a foreign policy goal within autocratic regimes. As Donno 
suggests, authoritarian countries ‘are more likely to oppose enforcement, simply 
because they value democracy less’ (Donno, 2013, p. 74). Consequently, countries 
with high levels of autocratic linkages are less likely to be subjected to costly 
sanctions that can weaken autocratic rule. This does not mean that countries will be 
free from any external democratic pressure, but it can ensure that democratic 
enforcement is not the universal response facing individual autocratic regimes during 
times of crisis. For example, the coup leaders who took power in Haiti in 1991 
enjoyed few ties to autocratic states, and faced universal, UN-authorised enforcement 
measures that contributed to their departure from power (Legler & Tieku, 2010). By 
contrast, the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe has a diverse set of international linkages, 
and strenuous enforcement measures by Western actors were not matched by the 
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 8 
regime’s autocratic partners in the region and beyond, many of whom actively 
resisted calls for international sanctions (Masunungure & Badza, 2010; Phimister & 
Raftopoulos, 2004). Channels of autocratic linkage thus shape the intensity of 
democracy enforcement likely to be faced by norm-violating autocratic regimes. 
Autocratic linkage also increases the likelihood that external actors will actively 
support autocratic incumbents. While the absence of international sanctions can be a 
welcome relief, the presence of robust external sponsorship (including economic and 
military assistance) contributes more directly to autocratic regime survival (Tansey, 
2016). International linkages increase the stakes that external actors have in the 
domestic regimes of other countries, but autocratic and democratic linkage are not 
equivalent in this respect. In particular, autocratic linkage heightens the fear of 
contagion between autocratic countries, and makes it more likely partners will assist 
one another in times of crisis. Scholarship on diffusion has shown how models of 
regime contention can spread quickly from one setting to another, especially between 
densely connected countries (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011, p. 300). Consequently, when 
autocratic stability is threatened in one country, its autocratic partners will have a 
strong incentive to support the imperilled incumbents and prevent democratisation as 
a means of protecting the status quo in their own countries. For example, in the wake 
of the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Putin’s regime in 
Moscow became concerned that a wave of democratic transitions in the region could 
lead to domestic overthrow in Russia. The result was an increasingly assertive foreign 
policy, entailing cooperation with and support for regional autocrats as part of a 
counter-revolutionary push (McFaul & Spector, 2009; Silitski, 2010). We explore this 
mechanism further in the final section of the article. 
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Finally, just as close autocratic linkages can enable fear of contagion to spread, so 
too can they facilitate processes of learning and emulation associated with diffusion. 
Incumbent elites with close linkages to other autocratic regimes will be more able to 
learn from, and cooperate with, foreign autocrats. Cross-border learning has 
contributed to authoritarian retrenchment in a number of settings, including the Arab 
Spring and in the wake of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe (Ambrosio, 2010; 
Heydemann & Leenders, 2011; Koesel & Bunce, 2013). Networks of autocratic 
regimes have shared technologies designed to restrict political and civil liberties with 
one another, with less advanced countries, such as Venezuela and Belarus, learning 
from their more advanced partners, such as Russia and China (Koesel & Bunce, 2013, 
p. 759). Regional autocratic linkages can facilitate such processes, as autocratic ‘first-
movers’ influence the policies of their regional partners. In Southeast Asia, for 
example, Singapore has acted as an exemplar for its neighbours in developing internet 
technology without sacrificing authoritarian control (Kalathil & Boas, 2010, p. 73). 
We thus argue that international linkages are important for autocratic regime 
survival, and that autocratic linkages in particular are likely to prolong the duration of 
autocratic regimes:  
 
Hypothesis: The higher the levels of autocratic linkages, the lower risk of 
autocratic regime breakdown.  
 
 
The Rise of Autocratic Linkage 
Autocratic linkage is constituted by cross-border ties between autocratic regimes. To 
approximate the economic, social, political, and geographic facets of international 
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autocratic linkage, we construct four indicators: autocratic linkage by trade, 
migration, diplomatic ties, and geographic proximity. 
We first identify our sample of autocratic regimes using the well-known dataset by 
Barbara Geddes and others (2014). Each linkage indicator is then constructed in a 
manner that reflects the intensity of ties a given autocracy on average entertains with 
autocratic partners in a given year. More precisely, for each autocratic regime in each 
year we sum up the volume of trade exchanged (in US-dollars), the number of people 
migrating to and from, the number of diplomatic envoys sent and received, and the 
distance (in kilometres) to all other autocracies in that year. The resulting figures are 
then put in relation to the given autocracy’s GDP (trade) or population (migration, 
diplomatic ties). Analogously, we construct indicators of each autocratic regime’s 
democratic linkages. 
In addition, we construct a set of alternative indicators based on average rather 
than total linkages, dividing the totals by the number of autocracies in the world, 
minus one. The two approaches allow us to examine two different understandings of 
how autocratic linkage can be compared over time. Particularly, total linkage levels 
are more easily affected by the changing numbers of autocratic regimes in the world 
during the last decades. Total autocratic linkage is likely to be higher if there are more 
autocracies to link to. By contrast, the variant employing the average linkage is less 
sensitive to fluctuating numbers of linkage partners and only reflects them if newly 
found or lost linkage connections are above or below average magnitude. In other 
words, this latter operationalisation can be understood as capturing the degree to 
which potential linkages are realised. It can result in similar linkage levels based on 
different numbers of linkage partners.  
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Between the two operationalisations, we are confident to capture important 
variation in international linkage. We use and understand the four indicators as 
proxies to the complex and multi-facetted underlying concept of autocratic linkage. 
We are confident that they represent reliable and valid measures of the most important 
economic, demographic, political, and geographic dimensions of international 
linkage. They enable us to capture the intensity of linkages that each autocratic regime 
has to the rest of the world’s autocracies, taking into account their size and economic 
capacity. They are also derived from the best available sources of country-dyad data, 
which facilitates fine-grained descriptive and statistical analysis of linkage patterns 
over several decades. We collect figures on trade and diplomatic relations from the 
Correlates of War project’s respective datasets (Barbieri, Keshk, & Pollins, 2009; 
Bayer, 2006). Migration data is from the World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration 
Database (Ozden, Parsons, Schiff, & Walmsley, 2011). We construct the indicators of 
average autocratic proximity from the cshapes dataset (Weidmann, Kuse, & 
Gleditsch, 2010). All these datasets are organised in a yearly country-dyad format, 
allowing us to assign regime types to both countries in a dyad, and then distinguish 
democratic from autocratic linkages.
1
 
Figure 1 illustrates an average autocratic regime’s linkage with both autocracies 
and democracies entertained on the four linkage dimensions between 1948 and 2009. 
To provide important context to these developments, we also show the proportion of 
autocracies in the world during this period. Our indicators provide strong evidence 
that autocratic linkage is on the rise, and that this development is decoupled from the 
decrease in the number of autocratic regimes in the world. Note that while Figure 1 
shows average linkage based on the sum aggregation discussed above, a very similar 
picture reveals itself when resorting to the average aggregation (see the online 
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appendix). An average autocracy’s linkage to other autocracies by trade and migration 
has been increasing, particularly during the most recent period of observation, and is 
now higher than it has ever been. Remarkably, these developments take place while 
the number of autocratic regimes in the world has been decreasing since the late 
1970s, and, as a consequence, so has the average added distance to other autocracies 
(see the fourth and fifth panel in Figure 1). Note that the increase in autocratic trade 
can only in part be attributed to the growing economic power of China. Even if trade 
with China is excluded, inter-autocratic trade increases remarkably in the most recent 
period. In contrast, average diplomatic linkage between autocracies has declined 
sharply since the 1980s. This is due to the fact that the number of autocratic regimes 
has dwindled since then. While trade and migration linkage can still be expanded by 
increasing exchanges with the remaining autocracies, the number of diplomatic ties 
has a natural cap induced by the number of available partners. The sensitivity of 
diplomatic linkage to the number of available linkage partners also explains the spike 
during the 1980s: this was the high-time of authoritarianism in the world, and when 
many autocracies disappeared in the early 1990s, the number of diplomatic linkages 
among the remaining ones would naturally decrease.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
   
The increase in autocratic linkage by trade and migration may well be the result of 
an intentional move to close ranks internationally. Particularly the fact that linkage 
increased relative to linkage between autocracies and democracies points to such an 
intentional shift in autocratic linkage politics. The exception is diplomatic linkage, 
which did not increase. Naturally, global proximity linkage is a function of decreasing 
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number of autocratic regimes and cannot be attributed to any intentional manoeuvers. 
However, we have to be cautious interpreting the rise in autocratic linkage as an 
intentional change in autocratic foreign policy. Alternative explanations are possible. 
For example, the rise in trade linkage might also reflect general economic 
development in some heavily autocratic regions. 
Although we use these indicators as proxies for our underlying concept of 
autocratic linkage, each also has a direct connection with autocratic survival. In the 
theoretical discussion above, we identified four central causal mechanisms through 
which autocratic linkage shapes the prospects of survival, and each of our indicators is 
associated with at least one of these mechanisms.  
The role of international trade illuminates the workings of our first causal 
mechanism, where important elites are incentivised to support the existing regime out 
of fear that any replacement would put external revenue at risk. Trade is an important 
source of state revenue, but trade policy is highly political and scholars have shown 
that trade is particularly likely to decline after leadership change in autocratic regimes 
(McGillivray & Smith, 2004). Russia, for example, has offered favourable trade terms 
to close allies (such as the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine) while making it clear that 
such favourable terms would be at risk in the event of regime change (Tolstrup, 2013, 
pp. 150–156). Consequently, the higher the levels of trade linkage between autocratic 
states, the greater the incentive that domestic elites have to maintain support for the 
existing regime and protect the status quo economic relations.  
The role of migration in our story concerns the risk to autocratic elites that comes 
with the spread of anti-regime mobilisation. Put simply, migration among autocratic 
regimes heightens the fear of contagion that arises when one regime experiences a 
destabilising crisis. ‘Immigrant activism’ is a key hallmark of transnational forms of 
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mobilisation and contentious politics (Tarrow, 2005, p. 48), and immigrant 
communities can act as a conduit of political unrest from their home country to their 
host country. Protests in one regime are thus more likely to cause concern among 
elites in other regimes where migration flows have served to bridge the gap between 
home and host country and where immigrant activists can act as potent agents of 
diffusion. Such concerns in turn increase the chances that these regimes will act to 
pre-empt domestic challenges at home and stave off potential contagion from 
neighbouring countries experiencing mass mobilisation.   
Diplomatic ties also have implications for the fear of contagion. When autocratic 
states have diplomatic relations together, they are more likely to gain information 
about the nature of, and threat from, protest events taking place in partner countries. 
The fear of contagion can thus be driven by both elite and non-elite forms of 
autocratic linkage. Diplomatic linkage also plays an important role in facilitating our 
fourth causal mechanism of elite learning. Elites can not only learn about the nature 
and extent of the threat from their diplomatic contacts, but are also more likely to 
learn how to suppress domestic challenges when they have close diplomatic 
connections with regimes with experience in suppressing public mobilisation. For 
example, Syrian efforts to withstand mass public protests in 2011 were informed in 
part through learning from long-standing and close diplomatic allies in Iran, and 
regime learning in the broader region during the Arab Spring was facilitated by 
diplomatic connections in the Gulf Cooperation Council (Heydemann, 2013; 
Heydemann & Leenders, 2011, p. 650). 
Finally, we argue that geographic proximity can also heighten the fear of contagion 
between regimes and facilitate inter-regime learning. Waves of regime contention 
often have their most significant impact on countries closest to the first-movers, as 
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actors perceive conditions to be most similar among neighbouring states (Bunce & 
Wolchik, 2011, p. 281). As a result, mass mobilisation in one country is likely to pose 
a serious threat to neighbouring autocratic elites, who may thus wish to offer robust 
support to their besieged neighbours and stem the tide at its source. Close neighbours 
are thus more likely to work to preserve each other’s regimes in times of crisis and 
reduce the chances of autocratic collapse (e.g. Saudi Arabia intervened to support the 
regime in Bahrain in part due to the risk of contagion created by such close 
proximity). Geographic proximity also facilitates learning, as elites can more easily 
gain information about the strategies of control used by neighbouring countries and 
employ them at home to stave off mass uprisings within their own regime. Just as 
processes of popular mobilisation can diffuse more easily among proximate countries, 
so too can processes of ‘counterdiffusion’ operate more easily in neighbouring 
countries, as elites learn how to respond to threats from below and employ strategies 
of concession or repression to pre-empt successful uprisings (Weyland, 2010, p. 
1165).  
 
 
Statistical Analysis and Results 
We now test the effect of the four indicators of autocratic linkage on the survival of 
autocratic regimes. We employ Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2014) data on the 
survival of autocratic regimes to specify our dependent variable. Their data are unique 
in capturing the transition of one autocratic regime to another. Alternative measures 
of autocratic persistence often equate autocratic breakdown with democratisation, 
therefore missing out on most of the variation. 
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We include a number of control variables which might confound an association 
between the level of autocratic linkage and the longevity of autocratic regimes. First, 
we control each indicator of autocratic linkage for the corresponding indicator of 
democratic linkage. This ensures we do not conflate the effects of autocratic linkages 
with the effects of international linkages in general.  
Second, we control the effects of autocratic linkage by trade, migration, and 
diplomatic ties for the average proximity to other autocratic regimes.  Geographic 
linkage plays a particular role in our research design. While proximity can serve as a 
valid linkage indicator in its own right, it might also be a driver of trade linkage, 
migration, and diplomatic ties. However, we believe autocratic linkage is more than 
just proximity. While proximity might facilitate establishing linkages in various 
political and socio-economic dimensions, we believe that deliberate attempts to 
strengthen linkage ties transcend mere neighbourhood effects. If this is true, effects of 
linkage by trade, migration, and diplomatic ties should be robust to the inclusion of 
proximity as a control variable. At the same time, proximity as a linkage indicator 
should exert a significant effect itself.  
Third, we control for the effects of linkage with two predominant autocratic Black 
Knights, China and Russia, making sure that any relationships we find are not the 
result of linkage with these two influential autocratic patrons. Indicators of Black 
Knight Linkage, analogous to our other linkage indicators, give the sum or average 
trade, diplomatic ties, migration, or distance of a given autocratic regime to China and 
Russia.  
Fourth, we control for the global proportion of autocratic regimes in all models, 
making sure that the effects of autocratic linkage we find are not simply the 
consequence of a more or less autocratic world.   
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We further control for GDP per capita and GDP growth (Bolt & van Zanden, 2013; 
retrieved from Teorell et al., 2015), both of which are likely to be associated with at 
least two of our linkage indicators, trade and migration. Richer and faster growing 
economies often trade more, and the numbers of both immigrants and emigrants may 
vary with economic performance of a country and its partners.  
We also control for state capacity in all models, as strong states may be more likely 
to survive and may provide a fertile environment for trading enterprises and attract 
immigration. We employ the Composite Index of National Capacity composed by the 
Correlates of War project (Singer, 1987).  
We include a dummy variable marking the Cold War period in all models. This 
helps us isolate the effect of our linkage indicators from endogenous dynamics of the 
Cold War period, in which autocracies were persistent and linkages were elaborate 
due to the confrontation of the Western and Eastern blocs.  
Additionally, we control for natural resource abundance (measured as the sum of 
oil and gas production as a proportion of GDP) and oil price (in dollars per barrel) in 
the trade model (Ross, 2013; retrieved from Teorell et al., 2015). Resource-rich 
autocracies are known to be remarkably stable (for example Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001). 
At the same time, oil and gas exporters naturally have higher trade figures. Changing 
oil prices can bring resource exporters under duress and affect trade figures of both 
importers and exporters of oil.   
Finally, the occurrence of internal armed conflict is controlled for when testing the 
effect of migration linkage (Themner & Wallensteen, 2014).  
We use the Cox proportional hazards survival model to assess the effect of 
indicators of autocratic linkage on autocratic regime survival. We test the crucial 
proportional hazards assumption and, following established best practice, adjust for 
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non-proportional hazards by including interaction terms with the logarithm of survival 
time for problematic covariates (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001; Golub, 2007, 
2008).  
Table 1 presents the results of six Cox models employing in turn the trade, 
migration, and diplomatic exchange indicators of autocratic linkage in the two 
variants discussed above. All models include the fourth linkage indicator, autocratic 
proximity (or rather, autocratic distance). Note that we use standardised versions of 
the indicators to render effect sizes commensurable. Note also that we do not run a 
model including all linkage indicators. Our argument concerns the effects of 
autocratic linkage in general, rather than the relative effect of a particular variable. 
We understand our linkage indicators as proxies of a country’s overall linkage and put 
less emphasis on the specificities of individual linkage dimensions. (The exception 
here is proximity linkage, which is likely to be driving factor of all other linkage 
dimensions as well as a linkage indicator in its own right, and is thus entered as a 
control variable in all models.) Only if we were interested in the effects of autocratic 
trade as opposed to autocratic migration and diplomatic ties (and vice versa) would 
we need to control one for the others. In addition, inclusion of multiple linkage 
indicators is likely to result in multicollinearity, which is best avoided.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The findings lend strong support to our hypothesis. Autocratic linkage across all 
four linkage dimensions significantly reduces the risk of autocratic breakdown, as can 
be seen from the negative and significant coefficients of autocratic linkage by trade, 
migration, and diplomatic ties, and the positive and significant coefficients of 
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autocratic distance. According to the first three models employing the sum 
aggregation of overall linkage, an increase by one standard deviation in overall inter-
autocratic trade (equivalent to 18.3% of GDP), migration (8.9% of the population), 
and diplomatic ties (4.6 diplomatic ties per 1 million inhabitants), and a decrease by 
one standard deviation in the cumulative distance to autocracies (186,652km) 
decreases the risk of autocratic breakdown by ninety-four, twenty-four, thirty-seven, 
and seventeen percent, respectively.
2
 Note that effects hold when the first three 
linkage indicators are controlled for autocratic distance, indicating that these linkage 
dimensions are not a mere function of geography. These effects are substantively very 
similar, albeit slightly smaller, when the average aggregation indicators are 
considered (the last three models in Table 1). Note that diplomatic linkage when 
aggregated via global averages appears to exert a time-dependent effect, represented 
by the negative and significant interaction term with survival time, and implying that 
average diplomatic linkage stabilises autocratic only in autocratic regimes of a certain 
age. We included the time-interactive term following a proportional hazard violation 
of the covariate. The effects of all other linkage indicators are constant over time. We 
subject these findings to a rigid set of robustness test involving different 
operationalisations of the dependent variable, different constellations of control 
variables, and different time-lags (see below and in the online appendix).
 
The findings 
of these tests provide further strong support for our argument. 
Figure 2 illustrates and substantiates these findings. Using the results from the 
models above, we simulate the effects of our linkage indicators (King, Tomz, & 
Wittenberg, 2000; Licht, 2011). Higher values within the interquartile range of trade, 
migration, diplomatic linkage, and autocratic distance (plotted on the x-axis) are 
associated with lower risks of autocratic regime breakdown (plotted on the y-axis) 
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relative to the risk associated with the minimum observed value in our data. In 
contrast, as the average distance to autocracies increases, so does the risk of regime 
breakdown relative to the regime with the smallest average autocratic distance. It 
appears that the effects of trade and distance are similarly strong, while migration and 
diplomatic ties exert a somewhat weaker effect. Note that the inner 95 percent of one 
thousand simulations (illustrated by the grey shaded area and analogous to a 95 
percent confidence interval) exclude a hazard ratio of 1, implying that the effects are 
substantively significant at (at least) the 5 percent level. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The combination of our four measures of autocratic linkage as well as a series of 
time-lags we employ (see Table 2 below) safeguards our findings against 
endogeneity. Regarding the trade and diplomacy linkage indicators, the causal arrow 
could well point in the other direction. Autocratic regimes that have been around for 
longer have had more time to establish trade and diplomatic relations with other 
autocracies. In other words, autocratic durability could cause higher autocratic 
linkage, rather than the other way around. If this were the case, we would wrongly 
take causes for effects. However, while endogeneity could be a problem with regards 
to trade and diplomatic linkage, an inverse causal relationship between autocratic 
persistence and migration is hardly plausible, and outright impossible with regards to 
proximity. We do not have reason to expect that in longer lasting autocracies, people 
tend to migrate more to other autocracies than anywhere else. And of course, 
autocracies do not move geographically closer to one another the longer they exist. As 
a further precaution against endogeneity, we show our findings when employing 
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different time-lags of the covariates (see Table 2 below). Most of the effects we found 
maintain up until a four-year time-lag, with the exception of both indicators of 
diplomatic linkage, which are negative throughout, indicating a autocracy sustaining 
effect, but only significant in the model without lags, and the one-year lag-model 
presented in Table 1. Finally, lagged by five years, trade linkage also loses 
significance.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
To conclude, we find effects of autocratic linkage while holding constant an 
autocratic regime’s democratic linkage, linkage to China and Russia (Black Knight 
Linkage), and the global proportion of autocratic regimes. The effect of democratic 
linkage is ambiguous at best. It is insignificant in most models in Table 1, and has a 
positive effect only in the first and a time-dependent effect in the third model. This 
ambiguity matches mixed accounts in the literature: While sometimes democratic 
influence from abroad is said to undermine autocratic regimes, democracies have also 
been shown to support autocratic regimes if it serves their purposes (Brownlee, 2012; 
Cox, Ikenberry, & Inoguchi, 2000; Schmitz, 2006). The interesting (non-)finding 
would deserve more attention. However, a more detailed discussion is beyond the 
scope of this article and must be pursued in future research.  
Similarly, the supportive effect of Black Knight linkage pointed out in the 
literature on the influence of China and Russia does not seem to hold when 
contrasting it against global autocratic linkages. In most models, the coefficient is 
negative but insignificant. In the two trade models, it is significantly positive, 
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indicating in stark contrast to the literature that Black Knight linkage might 
undermine rather than fortify autocratic regimes.  
Finally, we can confirm that a more autocratic global climate, captured here by the 
proportion of global autocracies, significantly reduces the likelihood of autocratic 
regime breakdown. However, this effect seems to wear off in older autocracies, 
judging from the significantly positive, albeit smaller, time-interactive effect found in 
all models. Importantly, however, the proportion of autocracies in the world does not 
inhibit the effects of autocratic linkage. Autocratic linkage supports autocratic rule, 
regardless of how many autocracies there are.   
 
 
Autocratic Linkages in the Arab Spring: The Saudi Counter-Revolution 
Having demonstrated that autocratic linkages contribute to the stability of 
authoritarian regimes, we now submit our theory to a different type of test by turning 
to the events of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring presents an ideal test case for our 
theory: while six Arab countries saw regime-threatening instability in early 2011, only 
three experienced regime breakdown as a result of popular uprisings.
3
 Following the 
literature (Brownlee et al. 2015, p. 60), we treat Libya as a case of non-breakdown 
because Gadhafi lost power in the context of NATO-led external intervention, not as a 
result of the mass uprising proper. Based on our findings, we would expect cases of 
non-breakdown to exhibit a significantly higher density of autocratic linkages. 
Moreover, at a lower level of analysis, we should also be able to observe how dense 
linkages are translated into concrete measures of support.   
On the aggregate level, to begin with, the connection between high linkage levels 
and regime durability we observed above is also visible in the Arab Spring. As Table 
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3 shows, the cases of non-breakdown (Bahrain, Libya, and Syria) show higher linkage 
levels on three of the four measures (trade, migration, and distance) when compared 
to all other countries. Moreover, all of our linkage indicators with the exception of 
distance suggest a higher level of autocratic linkages for the non-breakdown group 
than for the group of countries that experienced breakdown as a result of mass 
protests (Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen). Moving to individual countries, our measures 
are strong predictors of regime trajectories in the Arab Spring as well. Based on 
linkage density alone, we would have failed to correctly predict the outcome only in 
the Syrian case, where relatively low linkage density would have suggested a higher 
likelihood of regime breakdown. In the remaining five cases, our linkage indicators 
point in the direction suggested by our theory with only minor exceptions. Merely the 
distance component does not perform well, a fact which can be explained with the 
above-average concentration of autocratic regimes in the Middle East.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Instead of concluding that our argument is supported by the Arab Spring and 
stopping the analysis here, we follow suggestions in the methodological literature and 
test implications of our theory beyond the original set of hypotheses discussed above 
(King, Keohane & Verba, 1995, p. 227). In particular, exploiting the strengths of 
small-N case studies, we use evidence from the Arab Spring to examine one of our 
four causal mechanisms in detail, and explore the ways in which autocratic linkage 
increases the likelihood that an authoritarian regime will receive external support in 
times of crisis. As Lieberman observes, this strategy “requires a shifting of levels of 
analysis” turning from the aggregate level to “an examination of within-case 
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processes” (Lieberman, 2005, p. 440; emphasis in the original).   
We thus start from the observation that, in accordance with our theory, countries 
with denser autocratic linkages were less likely to experience regime breakdown in 
the Arab Spring. In a further step we examine one way in which dense autocratic 
linkages are connected to regime survival: via supportive action by international 
allies. In order to observe this causal mechanism, we focus on the actions of a single 
external actor. As has been observed, Saudi Arabia “positioned itself as the chief 
architect of a counterrevolution to contain, and perhaps even to reverse, the Arab 
Spring as much as possible” (Kamrava, 2012, p. 96). The Saudi regime mobilized its 
considerable diplomatic, financial, and even military resources to support some of the 
region’s autocrats in times of crisis (al-Rasheed, 2011; Kamrava, 2012; Rieger, 2014). 
Yet, Saudi policy towards the Arab Spring was not as uniform as is sometimes 
implied by proponents of the counterrevolution narrative: Only in three cases out of 
six – namely in Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen – did the Kingdom actually intervene on 
the side of the incumbent regime. In the three other cases – in Libya, Syria, and 
Tunisia – Saudi policy ranged from benign disinterest (Tunisia), to support for 
international military action against the regime (Libya), and active support of the 
armed opposition (Syria). In brief, Saudi policy towards the Arab Spring was not 
driven by a mere reflex in favour of the status quo, but varied across different cases. If 
our causal mechanism is well specified, we would expect Saudi Arabia to act in 
support of embattled autocrats in cases of dense linkages, but remain silent or even 
voice support for the opposition in cases of low linkages.  
International support in times of regime crisis does not perfectly predict autocratic 
survival and the Saudi counterrevolution in the Arab Spring is no exception in this 
regard. In Egypt and Yemen, to begin with, autocrats eventually fell despite Saudi 
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support, although in both cases Saudi Arabia continued to influence post-breakdown 
dynamics. In Syria, on the other hand, Bashar al-Assad survived in office despite 
Saudi opposition. In this section, we aim to show that autocratic linkage density 
increases the likelihood that an embattled incumbent will receive support from 
international autocratic allies. We are not claiming, however, that international 
support is always effective, much less that autocratic linkage can explain regime 
outcomes in the Arab Spring more generally. As the comparative literature on regime 
outcomes in the Arab Spring has demonstrated, regime trajectories in the Arab Spring 
were significantly shaped by domestic factors, notably the behaviour of the coercive 
apparatus (Bellin, 2012; Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). We do not purport to 
offer an alternative explanation for regime trajectories in the Arab Spring, but merely 
to illustrate how—all other things equal—autocratic linkage contributes to 
authoritarian stability by inducing international allies to lend support to their 
embattled allies. 
 
 
Saudi Responses to the Arab Uprisings 
One advantage of focusing on crisis periods is that our theory makes clear predictions 
on the expected behaviour of international actors. In a nutshell, when authoritarian 
regimes are confronted with an immediate challenge to their stability, we would 
expect external autocratic allies to intervene in support in cases of high linkage 
density, but not in cases in which linkages are weak. External autocratic sponsorship 
can take a variety of forms, and here we focus on two broad categories of support 
(Tansey, 2016). First, external actors can seek to divert potential pressure against 
embattled regimes originating from other international actors, for example by 
blocking international sanctions. Second, supportive actions by international 
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autocratic allies can also include direct material or political interventions at the 
domestic level, including financial assistance or the supply of weapons. The Saudi 
reaction to the Arab Spring comprised both types of external support to autocratic 
regimes under stress. We first outline these reactions and then turn to the role of 
linkages in explaining variance in Saudi behaviour.  
 
Diluting External Pressure: The repression of domestic uprisings often creates 
punitive international costs, as external actors seek to sanction and isolate the regime. 
Yet autocratic allies can support beleaguered autocratic incumbents by blocking 
attempts at international condemnation or sanctions. Saudi Arabia’s actions in support 
of the Mubarak regime in Egypt provide an important example. The late King 
Abdallah was an open critic of the public protests in Egypt and notified US President 
Obama by phone that Saudi Arabia would substitute for US aid to Egypt if the United 
States were to withdraw their assistance (Elaph, 2011). This was a clear signal to the 
United States that contemplating economic sanctions against Egypt by withholding 
US assistance would be pointless since Saudi Arabia would cover the bill. Even as 
late as 8 February 2011, three days before Mubarak’s forced resignation, Saudi Arabia 
joined the UAE and Israel among other Middle Eastern allies of the United States in 
lobbying the White House not to put too much pressure on Mubarak (New York 
Times, 2011). 
Saudi Arabia used the same strategy in support of the new military rulers in Egypt 
after the military coup of 3 July 2013, again offering to compensate Egypt for 
potential losses in American aid in the context of the military’s crackdown on the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Riyadh also offered vocal diplomatic support in ways that 
clearly signalled the strength of the new regime’s international alliances. Following 
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the 3 July 2013 return of the Egyptian military to political power, the Saudi 
announced that “the people and government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stood 
and still stand today with our brothers in Egypt against terrorism, extremism and 
sedition, and against whomever is trying to interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs” (cited 
in Rieger, 2014, p. 11). Quite predictably, the Saudi, Emirati and Kuwaiti authorities 
were the first to congratulate Adly Mansour who became interim President after 
Mursi’s deposition and expressed strong support for the Egyptian military (Rieger, 
2014, p. 11).  
By contrast, the Saudis never used comparable language to describe the protests in 
Tunisia. They merely affirmed their support for the “brotherly people of Tunisia,” 
simultaneously making it known that Ben Ali was not to engage in political activities 
while a guest in Saudi Arabia (Al-Arab, 2011). In the case of Libya, moreover, the 
GCC referred to the Libyan regime as ‘illegitimate’ and spoke of the demands of the 
Libyan people early on in the crisis. Published in the wake of a meeting of GCC 
foreign ministers in Riyadh on 10 March 2011 (and thus four days prior to GCC 
intervention in Bahrain), the statement denounced the use of violence against civilians 
and called on the Arab League and the United Nations to impose a no-fly zone (Al-
Sharq al-Awsat, 2011). In brief, Saudi public pronouncements on the uprisings in the 
Arab Spring clearly followed a differentiated policy, designed to divert pressure from 
and generate international support for specific regimes and to foster opposition 
against others.  
 
Direct support for domestic incumbents: As well as seeking to minimise international 
costs and maximise international support, external autocratic allies can also seek to 
bolster autocratic incumbents through direct assistance at the domestic level. By 
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directly intervening in support of an authoritarian incumbent (through surges in 
financial aid, arms transfers, or even direct military intervention), autocratic allies 
cover parts of the direct, material costs of the conflict and enhance the regime’s room 
to manoeuvre. Saudi intervention in Bahrain under the cover of the Peninsula Shield 
Force (quwwat dir‘ al-jazira al-mushtarika) maintained by the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) offers a clear example of such material support. Officially acting on 
the request of the Bahraini government, observers have suggested that the initiative 
actually came from the Saudi regime itself, which felt threatened by the potential 
cross-border implications of political change in Bahrain (also see Odinius & Kuntz, 
2015; Rieger, 2014, p. 7). Part of the reason for this threat perception was the fact that 
Saudi Arabia was concerned about the effects of the Bahraini uprising on its own 
restive Shia minority in the Eastern Province (Wehrey, 2013). Given the tight 
interconnections between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the Saudi regime had an interest 
in containing the situation in Bahrain. While Saudi troops were not directly involved 
in repressive activity, they nevertheless freed up Bahraini capabilities that could then 
be deployed against the protesters. In brief, by sending troops to Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia took over parts of the direct costs of repressing the Bahraini uprising. 
GCC stabilization efforts in Bahrain also included financial aid. In March 2011 the 
GCC foreign ministers set up a USD 20 billion fund for Bahrain and Oman with the 
aim of bolstering these two poorer member states’ capacity to counteract 
economically motivated domestic dissent. Bahrain used these resources in part to 
create 20,000 new jobs in the Ministry of Interior, no small feat in a country of 
600,000 inhabitants (Hertog, 2011).  
Financial aid was also an important instrument in Saudi policy towards the post-
revolutionary Egyptian regime. The Saudis supported the return to power of Egypt’s 
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military elite by first starving the post-Mubarak MB-led regime of financial aid, and 
then massively increasing aid flows immediately after the July 2013 military takeover. 
Although Saudi Arabia had pledged support to Egypt in the form of a USD 4 billion 
loan in May 2011, the actual disbursement of this loan was delayed. Similarly, in 
October 2011 the UAE had pledged USD 3 billion in aid to Egypt, but then failed to 
disburse the amount until July 2013, arguing that the mechanisms of delivery had not 
yet been decided upon (Farouk, 2014, pp. 10–11). The flow of GCC (with the 
exception of Qatari) money into Egypt only resumed following the July 3rd military 
takeover. On 9th and 10th July 2013, about a week after the coup, Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE and Kuwait each announced aid packages to Egypt with a total volume of USD 
12 billion. By January 2014, the Central Bank of Egypt declared that it had already 
received USD 9 billion and even returned a USD 2 billion deposit made earlier by 
Qatar (Farouk, 2014, pp. 11–12).  
In Yemen, finally, Saudi influence was equally consequential. Saudi Arabia had 
long cultivated networks of supporters among the Yemeni tribes. While systematic 
figures are not available, in the year 2000, Saudi Arabia’s Special Committee for 
Yemeni Affairs (SCYA) through which Saudi influence was channelled had a budget 
of USD 3.5 billion and estimates on the number of Yemeni political actors on the 
Saudi payroll before the 2011 uprising go into the thousands (Burke, 2013; Phillips, 
2011). In 2008, the Kingdom confirmed that it had paid a monthly stipend of USD 
800,000 to the paramount shaykh of the Hashid tribal confederation (the most 
important tribal group in the country to which President Salih belonged) and that it 
would continue to pay the same amount to the shaykh’s sons after his death (US 
Diplomatic Cable, 2009; Phillips, 2011, p. Chapter 3 and 4). In the context of the 
uprising in Yemen, Saudi Arabia used these connections to create domestic support 
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for its transition plan (later known as the GCC initiative) that included President 
Salih’s resignation, but also “ensure[d] roles for as many members of the Saleh 
regime as possible” (Horton, 2011). In particular, the GCC initiative made sure to 
exclude the Houthi-movement, Saudi Arabia’s most vocal internal critic, from the 
transitional process—a decision that significantly contributed to the failure of conflict 
resolution in Yemen and also explains Saudi Arabia’s armed intervention in the 
Yemeni crisis since early 2015.  
 
Linkage Intensity and Saudi Support 
How well do these different forms of support align with the density of linkages 
between Saudi Arabia and the countries hit by uprisings during the Arab Spring? On 
the aggregate level, to begin with, the evidence supports our hypothesis: employing 
the operationalization of autocratic linkages in terms of trade volumes, migration 
flows, and diplomatic ties we introduced above, the three countries that received some 
kind of support from the Saudi regime during their respective crises (Bahrain, Egypt, 
Yemen) show significantly higher levels of linkage density than the three countries 
that did not (Libya, Syria, Tunisia). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
As Table 4 shows, those countries that were supported by Saudi Arabia in the Arab 
Spring traded significantly more with the kingdom than those that were not, they 
contributed more to the immigrant population in Saudi Arabia,
4
 they universally had 
full diplomatic relations at all times between 1990 and 2005, and the distance between 
their capitals and Riyadh is significantly smaller. In brief, our four different linkage 
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indicators align well with Saudi policies towards the Arab uprisings on the aggregate 
level. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
If we break this information down to the country level, the picture becomes less 
clear-cut, but still offers considerable support for our arguments. Table 5 displays the 
strength of linkages with Saudi Arabia for all six Arab Spring countries. There are 
two cases with weak linkages to Saudi Arabia (Libya and Tunisia) and four cases with 
relatively high linkage density (Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen). 
 Bahrain, the country that arguably saw the most intense form of Saudi intervention 
during the Arab Spring also has the highest level of linkage density. In the Bahraini 
case this is mainly a function of the extraordinarily dense trade relations between the 
two Gulf countries: As displayed in Table 5, the trade volume with Saudi Arabia 
accounted for more than 40% of Bahraini GDP during the 2000s, a fact that can in no 
small measure be explained by Bahraini dependence on Saudi oil. Egypt and Yemen, 
in turn, show lower, but still considerable levels of linkage density with Saudi Arabia 
in terms of trade volumes and migration flows, and Saudi Arabia’s reaction aligns 
with linkage patterns in the expected way. 
The same can be said for Libya and Tunisia. As Table 5 reports, trade linkages and 
migration movements between Saudi Arabia and both Libya and Tunisia were weak. 
In addition, Libya did not maintain uninterrupted diplomatic relations with Saudi 
Arabia throughout the 2000s. In accordance with our expectations, Saudi Arabia did 
not offer any support to these two countries during the Arab Spring. While linkages 
between Saudi Arabia and Libya were negligible, the Kingdom’s opposition against 
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Qadhafi was probably also influenced by his erratic nature and the ongoing, personal 
row between the Libyan leader and the Saudi King.
5
 In Tunisia, the Saudis applied a 
cautious and largely indifferent strategy. While they continued to back Egypt’s Husni 
Mubarak at about the same time, they did not come out in support of Tunisian 
president Zine al-Abidin Ben Ali. Although Ben Ali was granted exile in Saudi 
Arabia, he was not allowed to engage in political activities while in Saudi Arabia 
(Gulfnews, 2011).  
The only case that does not conform to our expectations is Syria. As reported in 
Table 5, Syria actually enjoyed relatively strong linkages with Saudi Arabia both in 
terms of trade and migration flows. As all other Arab Spring countries with the 
exception of Libya, Syria also enjoyed full diplomatic relations with the Saudi 
monarchy throughout the 2000s. At the same time, however, Saudi policy in the 
Syrian crisis has not only been non-supportive, but actually outright hostile towards 
the Syrian regime. While this aspect of Saudi policy towards the Arab Spring is 
probably driven by regional strategic considerations – such as Syria’s alignment with 
Iran and Hizballah – it nevertheless goes against our expectations.  
This points to a major limitation of probabilistic arguments. While linkage 
density—as measured by trade, migration, diplomatic ties, and proximity—provides a 
strong explanation on average, linkage patterns cannot account for all observable 
variation. Neither do our linkage measures capture the all the nuances of international 
and regional alliances, nor does linkage completely determine the foreign policy of 
autocratic states. The fact that Syria is an outlier both when compared to all other 
autocracies globally (Table 3), and when compared to the other Arab Spring countries 
(Table 5), is illustrative of this limitation. On average, however, our measures 
represent a valid approximation of linkage density and we find strong support for the 
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stabilizing effect of autocratic linkage. This claim is supported by our statistical 
results and the remaining five Arab Spring cases with the exception of Syria.  
Moreover, we find no plausible alternative explanation that can account for the 
pattern of Saudi support. The principal alternative explanations would focus on Saudi 
national interests, variously defined in terms of the containment of Iran as a major 
Shi’a power, the protection of fellow monarchies in the region, or the stabilisation of 
their immediate neighbourhood (see Ennis & Momani, 2013). None of these 
arguments provide a better alternative to linkage patterns. Confessionalism and the 
containment of Iran, to begin with, could be adduced as an explanation for Saudi 
intervention in support of the Sunni-led minority regime in Bahrain, but hardly 
provide a convincing explanation for Saudi support to Egypt (but not Sunni Tunisia) 
or the fact that the kingdom traditionally maintained ties of patronage to Zaydi Shia 
tribal elites in Yemen. Monarchical regime type or proximity do not fare much better 
as alternative explanations. Saudi Arabia gave support to both monarchies and 
republics in the Arab Spring. Proximity as an isolated factor might explain the 
kingdom’s support for the regime in neighbouring Bahrain and Saudi indifference 
towards the events in far-away Tunisia, but proximity alone does not explain variation 
in Saudi reactions among the group of countries that share similar distances to Saudi 
Arabia, nor can proximity account for Saudi hostility towards distant Libya.  
In sum, we find ample empirical evidence to back up the plausibility of our 
hypothesized causal mechanism linking autocratic linkage to external support in times 
of crisis. Our argument is not that autocratic linkages are completely independent of 
strategic considerations, but rather that once created, they can have independent 
effects. Linkages create vested interests on both sides and, once in place, generate 
path dependencies that shape the likelihood of specific foreign policy choices. As the 
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Syrian outlier suggests, high linkage density operates more as a necessary, rather than 
sufficient, condition for external support. Nonetheless, the pattern of Saudi policy 
across the Arab Spring cases points to a compelling and important role for autocratic 
linkage in shaping a key mechanism in our causal story, namely, the role of external 
support for beleaguered autocratic incumbents in times of contentious politics.  
 
 
Conclusion  
In recent years, various scholars have sought to account for the effects of international 
linkage on regime survival. These studies, however, have tended to deal only with a 
truncated sample of international linkages and have lacked a systematic analysis of 
linkage over time and across regions. We have made several significant contributions 
to our understanding of the nature of international linkages and their effects on regime 
survival. We have shown the importance of viewing autocratic linkage as a distinct 
form of cross-border relationship that has varied over time independently of 
democratic linkages. Although autocratic linkages have been slow to develop, in 
recent years they have been growing at a greater rate than democratic linkages. We 
have also shown that autocratic linkages are crucial in explaining patterns of 
autocratic survival in recent decades. Authoritarian regimes that have higher 
autocratic linkages are likely to survive longer, and the stronger the linkages, the 
greater the effect. We have demonstrated this effect empirically through a robust 
quantitative analysis of global patterns of international linkages over several decades, 
and have thus offered one of the first statistical tests of linkage-based theories of 
regime survival. An analysis of Saudi policies in the wake of the Arab Spring 
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provides further evidence of the importance of international linkage in shaping 
patterns of external support for authoritarian regime survival. 
Our findings have important implications for the future prospects of democracy. 
As discussed above, we have witnessed a surge in autocratic linkages since 2000 that 
shows no sign of abating. Autocratic regimes are increasing their trade, migration 
flows, and diplomatic exchange with other autocracies even as the total number of 
democracies in the world declines. As these ties make autocratic breakdown less 
likely, we should expect the world’s remaining authoritarian regimes to be more 
resilient to prevailing democratising pressures than those of the recent past. This is a 
sobering finding for those who have an interest in the further spread of democracy. 
The tightening of relations between autocratic states poses significant challenges to 
would-be democratic reformers, and as the rise in levels of autocratic linkage is 
ongoing, the future holds out little prospect for radical democratic transformation in 
much of the world. As long as autocratic linkages remain firm, autocratic rulers will 
be difficult to dislodge.   
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1
 For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of the linkage indicators, 
please refer to the online appendix, codebook, and replication code available at 
http://cps.sagepub.com/content/... 
2
 Following from hazard ratios of HR Autocratic Trade =  exp(bAutocratic Trade) = exp(-
1.994)= 0.136, HR Autocratic Migration = exp(bAutocratic Migration) = exp(-0.272)= 0.762, HR 
Autocratic Diplomatic = exp(b Autocratic Diplomatic) = exp(-0.472)= 0.633, and HR Autocratic Distance 
= exp(-bDistance, Model 1) = exp(-0.185) = 0.832, computed from the first three models in 
Table 1.  
3
 Following Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds (2015, p. 60), we treat Libya as a case 
of foreign induced regime change (FIRC).  
4
 Numbers of Saudi migrants in Arab Spring states are generally lower and do not 
show significant differences across the two groups.  
5
 Qadhafi had called Abdallah a US-slave in the context of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq and a liar at the 2009 summit of the Arab League in Doha. 
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Autocratic Breakdown 
 
Trade 
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -1.994*** -0.272** -0.499** -1.576*** -0.240** 0.294 
 
(0.566) (0.124) (0.221) (0.485) (0.122) (0.248) 
Democratic Linkage 0.364** -0.059 0.578*** 0.206 -0.067 -0.003 
 
(0.154) (0.155) (0.178) (0.276) (0.138) (0.159) 
Autocratic Distance 0.185* 0.243** 0.176* 0.188** 0.222** 0.222** 
 
(0.099) (0.104) (0.101) (0.085) (0.091) (0.088) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.457** -0.263 -0.173 0.477** -0.312 -0.069 
 
(0.232) (0.242) (0.123) (0.221) (0.293) (0.148) 
Global Autocracies -4.239* -9.029*** -6.227** -3.323 -7.350** -4.657** 
 
(2.318) (3.454) (2.515) (2.128) (3.264) (2.064) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.046 -0.099 -0.058 -0.014 -0.099 -0.071 
 
(0.102) (0.123) (0.111) (0.105) (0.123) (0.109) 
GDP Growth 0.409 -4.159*** 0.421 0.174 -4.162*** 0.663 
 
(2.037) (1.168) (2.225) (2.240) (1.174) (2.171) 
State Capacity -24.125* -28.593* -43.703** -25.268 -27.534* -46.893** 
 
(12.925) (14.988) (21.767) (15.868) (15.429) (23.415) 
Cold War 0.606 1.538** 1.024** 0.338 1.318* 0.680 
 
(0.478) (0.715) (0.490) (0.454) (0.692) (0.441) 
Resources -1.626** 
  
-1.244* 
  
 
(0.700) 
  
(0.749) 
  
Oil Price 0.001 
  
0.0002 
  
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.022 
  
-0.012 
 
  
(0.096) 
  
(0.098) 
 
Autocratic Linkage * ln(T) 
     
-0.236*** 
      
(0.091) 
Democratic Linkage * ln(T) 
  
-0.181*** 
   
   
(0.060) 
   
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 2.441** 4.561*** 3.168*** 2.153** 4.283*** 2.678** 
 
(1.082) (1.439) (1.147) (1.049) (1.413) (1.100) 
GDP Growth * ln(T) -2.551** 
 
-2.543** -2.116** 
 
-2.619*** 
 
(0.996) 
 
(1.006) (1.046) 
 
(1.014) 
Cold * ln(T) -0.492** -1.008*** -0.627** -0.414* -0.947*** -0.512** 
 
(0.247) (0.303) (0.263) (0.235) (0.295) (0.251) 
Events 206 164 199 200 164 199 
Observations 3,912 3,051 3,737 3,588 3,049 3,737 
Log Likelihood -913.319 -684.135 -873.607 -871.193 -684.305 -874.497 
LR Test 
70.782
***
 
(df = 14) 
51.321
***
 
(df = 12) 
64.438
***
 
(df = 13) 
64.901
***
 
(df = 14) 
50.606
***
 
(df = 12) 
62.656
***
 
(df = 13) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
Linkage indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total 
and average migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. 
All covariates lagged by one year. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
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 Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
No Time Lags 
Autocratic Linkage -1.846
***
 -0.358
**
 -0.707
***
 -1.846
***
 -0.358
**
 -0.707
***
 
 
(0.699) (0.160) (0.238) (0.699) (0.160) (0.238) 
Autocratic Distance 0.253
***
 0.286
***
 0.257
***
 0.253
***
 0.286
***
 0.257
***
 
 
(0.094) (0.102) (0.099) (0.094) (0.102) (0.099) 
 
Two-Year Lags 
Autocratic Linkage -1.285*** -0.255** -0.295 -1.285*** -0.255** -0.295 
 
(0.455) (0.123) (0.214) (0.455) (0.123) (0.214) 
Autocratic Distance 0.178* 0.199** 0.184* 0.178* 0.199** 0.184* 
 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
 
Three-Year Lags 
Autocratic Linkage -1.330*** -0.311** -0.187 -1.330*** -0.311** -0.187 
 
(0.481) (0.136) (0.193) (0.481) (0.136) (0.193) 
Autocratic Distance 0.142 0.181* 0.179* 0.142 0.181* 0.179* 
 
(0.089) (0.096) (0.093) (0.089) (0.096) (0.093) 
 
Four-Year Lags 
Autocratic Linkage -1.236
***
 -0.285
**
 0.288 -1.236
***
 -0.285
**
 0.288 
 
(0.466) (0.139) (0.266) (0.466) (0.139) (0.266) 
Autocratic Distance 0.168
**
 0.204
**
 0.187
**
 0.168
**
 0.204
**
 0.187
**
 
 
(0.079) (0.091) (0.086) (0.079) (0.091) (0.086) 
 
Five-Year Lags 
Autocratic Linkage -0.662 -0.293
**
 -0.119 -0.662 -0.293
**
 -0.119 
 
(0.410) (0.132) (0.186) (0.410) (0.132) (0.186) 
Autocratic Distance 0.146
*
 0.184
**
 0.193
**
 0.146
*
 0.184
**
 0.193
**
 
 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses from models using 
different time lags. Linkage indicators standardised. Control variables (same as in Table 1) not shown: 
GDP, Growth, State Capacity, Cold War Resources, Oil Price, Conflict. Significance levels: * < .1, ** 
< .05, *** < .01 
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  Breakdown Non-Breakdown 
  Egypt Tunisia Yemen Bahrain Libya Syria all 
Trade 
(% of GDP) 
all -.18* -.15* -.10 1.20*** .11 -.15* .14** 
AS -.35** -.32** -.26* 1.27*** -.01 -.32** .52*** 
Migration 
(per thousand) 
all -.77*** -.98*** -.51** 1.93*** .21 -.81*** .76*** 
AS -.62 -.83* -.36 2.08** .37 -.65 .60 
Diplomatic 
(per million) 
all -.024 .008 -.017 .284*** .068*** -.014 .014 
AS - .087* -.057 - .079* .277*** .022 -.076* .124*** 
Distance 
(km) 
all -1,541*** -443 -1,296** -861** -1,486** -1,123** -1,131*** 
AS -491*** 805*** -202* 312** -426*** 3 62 
Note: The rows labeled “AS” use the Arab Spring countries as a comparison group, while the columns labeled “all” use all 
countries; in both cases averages for the 2000s are compared in one-tailed t-tests. All cell entries are differences in means, 
shaded cells contain differences in line with our expectations.   
*p<.1; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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 Trade  Migration Full 
Diplomatic 
Relations (N) 
Distance (in 
km)  Million USD 
% of GDP 
(Receiver) 
% of GDP 
(KSA) 
Absolute 
% of Sender 
Population 
Support 1,280  11.16 0.59 358,448 1.03 3 1,135 
No support 71 0.21 0.03 4,786 0.05 2 3,545 
Difference -1,209* -10.95* -0.55* -353,662 -0.98 1 2,409* 
Note: * = difference in means significant in a t-test at 95 per cent confidence level. Values for trade and migration  are 
averages for the 2000s; diplomatic relations captures whether full diplomatic relations were ever interrupted between 
1990 and 2005, and distance is the distance between Riyadh and the respective capital of the Arab Spring state in 
kilometres. 
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 Trade Volume as % of 
GDP 
Migrants in 
KSA as % of 
Population 
Diplomatic 
Relations 
with KSA 
(2000s) 
Distance  
(in km) 
Linkage 
Strength 
Receiver KSA 
Bahrain 42.42 0.86 0.04 Full 428 Strong 
Egypt 0.56 0.68 1.39 Full 1,636 Strong 
Libya 0.21 0.02 0.01 Interrupted 3,375 Weak 
Syria 0.85 0.58 0.65 Full 1,406 Strong 
Tunisia 0.20 0.05 0.10 Full 3,714 Weak 
Yemen 0.81 0.22 1.99 Full 1,072 Strong 
Note: The trade data are averages for 2000-2009, the migration data is for 2000, and the diplomatic relations data for 
the 2000s. Diplomatic relations are interrupted if ambassadors have been withdrawn at any point during the 2000s. 
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This online appendix provides supplementary discussion and analysis supporting the 
arguments presented in Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival. First, we 
discuss some key characteristics of the linkage indicators we constructed. Second we show 
alternative descriptive graphs and simulations based on average rather than total linkages 
indicators (we show the latte in the article). Third, we run a substantial number of additional 
models to corroborate the robustness of our findings, including models employing different 
constellations of control variables, alternative operationalisations of the dependent variable, 
including all linkage indicators at once, and different time-lags of covariates. In addition, we 
provide the results of the proportional hazards test of all models in the paper and this online 
appendix.  
 Discussion of Indicator Characteristics 1
We constructed two sets of autocratic linkage indicators, one based on the average level and 
the other on the total sum of linkages a given autocratic regime entertains with all other 
autocracies in the world on the vital linkage dimensions of trade (by GDP), migration (by 
population), diplomatic ties (by population), and geographic proximity. Constructed in this 
manner, the linkage indicators have particular advantages and disadvantages, and the sum and 
average aggregations result in particular commonalities and differences. We want to point out 
three of these characteristics we consider particularly important.   
First, as we have pointed out in the paper, the sum and average aggregations reflect changing 
numbers of autocracies in the world differently. While in the sum aggregation, every loss or 
gain of an autocratic linkage partner is registered, and thus results in an increase of decrease 
of autocratic linkage levels, the average aggregation is less sensitive to the global autocratic 
environment. Here, an increase or decrease in the number of linkage partners over the years 
only results in a rise of fall of the level of linkage if a regime upholds above or below average 
connections to these partners. As a consequence, the average linkage can remain the same, 
even if the number of autocratic partners changes. In contrast, the sum aggregation would 
register every such change. This affects the way in which linkages will be compared over 
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time: Average linkage can be the same in very autocratic and less autocratic times (for 
example, between the 1980s and today), while total linkage is more likely to reflect lower 
number of autocratic linkage in lower linkage level of individual autocracies. In other words, 
the two variants of the indicators reflect a slightly different understanding of how bilateral 
linkages translate into an overall level of linkage, and thus a slightly different logic of the 
concept formation of autocratic linkage. Our theory does not dictate either of the two 
understandings. By testing both, we are confident to capture important variation in autocratic 
linkage.  
Second, our measures do not discriminate between few strong bilateral linkages and many 
moderate ones. Both scenarios can result in similar overall linkage levels. In most cases, and 
particularly for most of our mechanisms, the two scenarios are indeed likely to be equivalent. 
For example, domestic beneficiaries of autocratic linkage might not care much whether 
revenues are derived from diverse or concentrated sources. Autocratic learning is likely to 
take place already with a relatively low level of linkage, and learning from multiple partners 
and comparing and weighing their relative success might be much more beneficial than more 
intense learning relationships with only a few partners. On the other hand, some mechanisms 
might be more effective if partners have denser linkage relations. For example, the fear of 
contagion and thus the inclination to offer support in times of crisis might be more 
pronounced among strongly linked partners. On balance, we are confident that more or less 
linkage dispersion can be equally beneficial, and our findings indicate they are. However, 
disentangling the differences between concentrated and dispersed linkage relations might be a 
fruitful endeavour for future research on autocratic linkages.   
Third, our measures do not discriminate between linkage to stronger and weaker partners 
(economically, politically, or by military force). This feature distinguishes our approach from 
studies focussing on the influence of (regional or global) autocratic patrons, i.e. regimes that 
are by definition particularly strong. By contrast, our measures emphasise the intensity of the 
actual linkage relation rather than the power of the patron. Even powerful patrons will have 
more influence in countries to which they are densely linked than in those they hardly have 
any connections with. What is more, while we do not weight linkage partners by their 
respective strength, it can be expected in many cases that particularly strong partners bring 
about higher levels of exchange. In other words, and implicit weighting is likely to be 
included in the measures.  
 Descriptive Graphs Based on Average Aggregations 2
Figure 1 below shows the development of an average autocratic regime’s autocratic and 
democratic linkage between 1948 and 2009, but instead of the sum aggregation shown in the 
article gives the average aggregation also tested throughout the article and this online 
appendix. The depicted figures match those derived from the sum aggregation and shown in 
the article in most regards and underline our interpretation of those figures. However, there 
are also some important differences. First, the realised values are notably smaller, as is only 
natural given the average instead of sum aggregation of dyad linkages to overall global 
linkages. Second, the increase in average autocratic trade linkage relative to democratic trade 
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linkage is much more pronounced. And third, autocratic diplomatic linkage indeed shows a 
small recent increase relative to democratic diplomatic linkage, but also in absolute terms. 
This finding provides some additional support for our cautious interpretation that autocratic 
regimes might consciously increase their efforts of autocratic linkage politics. Note also that 
due to the different aggregation democratic rather than autocratic diplomatic linkage appears 
to have the upper hand for most of the observation period. 
Figure 1: Average Autocracies' Autocratic and Democratic Linkages, 1948-2009, Average Aggregations 
 
 
 Simulation of Effects of Indicators Based on Average Aggregations 3
Figure 2 below illustrates a simulation of the constant effects of trade, migration and 
proximity linkage indicators based on average aggregations drawn from the (fourth and fifth) 
average aggregation models in Table 1 in the article (i.e. the last models from Tables 7 and 9 
below). While the range of values of average linkages are naturally a lot smaller than of 
sums, the strength of the effects across the inter-quartile range of the distribution is 
remarkably similar to the one of the sum-based indicator.   
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Figure 2: Simulated Constant Effects of Autocratic Linkage by Average Trade, Average Migration, and Average 
Distance on the Likelihood of Autocratic Regime Breakdown 
 
Figure 3: Simulated Time-Dependent Effect of Autocratic Linkage by Average Diplomatic Exchange on the 
Likelihood of Autocratic Regime Breakdown 
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Figure 3 shows the time-dependent effect of average diplomatic linkage, based on the last 
model in Table 1 in the article, or Table 11 in this online appendix. We can see that while 
hazard ratios are below one throughout the inter-quartile range, indicating a reduction of risk 
relative to minimum linkage scores, the effect become significant at the ten percent level only 
after about 17 years. 
 
 Control Variable Constellations 4
We first present six tables with different configurations of control variables of the trade, 
migration, and diplomatic linkage models based on the sum and average aggregations of the 
linkage indicators. We start with bivariate models and successively add control variables until 
the full models as presented in the article are complete. The effects of our linkage indicators 
hold and are statistically significant throughout all of these specifications.  
Table 2 provides the results of the proportional hazards tests of the models from Table 1, on 
the basis of which we include time-interactive terms in the models (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Zorn 2001; Golub 2007; Golub 2008). We rely on the established proportional hazards test 
developed by Grambsch and Therneau (1994). Every subsequent regression table will be 
followed by the respective proportional hazards tests.   
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Table 1: Alternative Trade Model Specifications, Sum Aggregation 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Autocratic Trade (Sum) -0.888
**
 -1.029
**
 -1.092
**
 -1.546
***
 -1.445
***
 -1.542
***
 -1.596
***
 -1.721
***
 -1.965
***
 -1.994
***
 
 
(0.349) (0.416) (0.431) (0.448) (0.432) (0.446) (0.452) (0.465) (0.546) (0.566) 
Democratic Trade (Sum) 
 
0.093 0.123 0.168 0.155 0.134 0.098 0.107 0.360
**
 0.364
**
 
  
(0.170) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.186) (0.200) (0.208) (0.149) (0.154) 
Autocratic Distance (Sum) 
  
0.179
***
 0.199
***
 0.237
***
 0.262
***
 0.249
***
 0.251
***
 0.188
*
 0.185
*
 
   
(0.062) (0.063) (0.082) (0.088) (0.087) (0.095) (0.099) (0.099) 
Black Knight Trade (Sum) 
   
0.270
*
 0.226 0.271
*
 0.313
*
 0.371
**
 0.457
**
 0.457
**
 
    
(0.138) (0.142) (0.157) (0.171) (0.175) (0.232) (0.232) 
Global Autocracies 
    
-0.742 -0.955 -1.037 -5.128
**
 -4.146
*
 -4.239
*
 
     
(0.816) (0.828) (0.821) (2.370) (2.284) (2.318) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.090 -0.052 -0.058 0.044 0.046 
      
(0.095) (0.101) (0.104) (0.102) (0.102) 
GDP Growth 
     
0.956 1.005 0.334 0.396 0.409 
      
(2.025) (2.002) (2.064) (2.039) (2.037) 
State Capacity 
      
-25.541
*
 -26.426
*
 -24.094
*
 -24.125
*
 
       
(13.449) (13.976) (12.946) (12.925) 
Cold War 
       
0.704 0.586 0.606 
        
(0.476) (0.463) (0.478) 
Resources 
        
-1.615
**
 -1.626
**
 
         
(0.691) (0.700) 
Oil Price 
         
0.001 
          
(0.004) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 
       
2.603
**
 2.436
**
 2.441
**
 
        
(1.107) (1.082) (1.082) 
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Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Growth * ln(T) 
     
-2.846
***
 -2.804
***
 -2.344
**
 -2.546
**
 -2.551
**
 
      
(0.956) (0.946) (0.971) (0.995) (0.996) 
Cold War * ln(T) 
       
-0.503
**
 -0.490
**
 -0.492
**
 
        
(0.253) (0.246) (0.247) 
Events 209 209 209 209 209 206 206 206 206 206 
Observations 4,027 4,027 4,026 4,026 4,026 3,968 3,912 3,912 3,912 3,912 
Log Likelihood -960.302 -960.083 -956.245 -955.247 -954.828 -925.471 -921.404 -917.344 -913.354 -913.319 
LR Test 
11.886
***
  
(df = 1) 
12.324
***
  
(df = 2) 
19.699
***
  
(df = 3) 
21.695
***
  
(df = 4) 
22.534
***
  
(df = 5) 
50.951
***
  
(df = 8) 
54.611
***
  
(df = 9) 
62.731
***
  
(df = 12) 
70.713
***
  
(df = 13) 
70.782
***
  
(df = 14) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as 
a GDP share, standardised total and average migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged by one year. 
Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
Table 2: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 1 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Autocratic Trade (Sum) 0.029 0.029 0.012 0.021 0.021 0.026 0.024 0.009 -0.004 0.026 
Democratic Trade (Sum) 
 
-0.008 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.01 -0.015 0.008 -0.021 
Autocratic Distance (Sum) 
  
0.089 0.081 0.026 0.021 0.018 -0.015 -0.023 -0.015 
Black Knight Trade (Sum) 
   
-0.037 -0.029 -0.049 -0.054 -0.06 -0.034 -0.05 
Global Autocracies 
    
0.047 0.028 0.035 0.132** 0.129** 0.146*** 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.052 -0.054 -0.059 -0.044 -0.054 
GDP Growth 
     
-0.222*** -0.216*** -0.172** -0.172*** -0.18*** 
State Capacity 
      
0.079 0.074 0.066 0.044 
Cold War 
       
-0.133*** -0.131** -0.148*** 
Resources 
        
-0.052 -0.031 
Oil Price 
         
-0.121* 
Global Test 
 
0.22 2.133 2.212 2.843 14.021* 13.694* 20.552** 20.442** 23.287** 
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Table 3: Alternative Migration Model Specifications, Sum Aggregation 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Autocratic Migration (Sum) -0.359
***
 -0.355
***
 -0.304
**
 -0.224
*
 -0.186 -0.201
*
 -0.257
**
 -0.268
**
 -0.272
**
 
 
(0.122) (0.129) (0.124) (0.114) (0.113) (0.116) (0.119) (0.124) (0.124) 
Democratic Migration (Sum) 
 
-0.027 -0.047 -0.037 -0.071 -0.049 -0.065 -0.058 -0.059 
  
(0.119) (0.126) (0.121) (0.128) (0.148) (0.156) (0.155) (0.155) 
Autocratic Distance (Sum) 
  
0.122 0.129
*
 0.205
**
 0.260
**
 0.241
**
 0.241
**
 0.243
**
 
   
(0.078) (0.078) (0.091) (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) 
Black Knight Migration (Sum) 
   
-0.263 -0.308 -0.266 -0.252 -0.265 -0.263 
    
(0.260) (0.265) (0.251) (0.239) (0.244) (0.242) 
Global Autocracies 
    
-1.768
*
 -1.900
*
 -1.908
*
 -8.994
***
 -9.029
***
 
     
(0.943) (0.994) (0.981) (3.469) (3.454) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.147 -0.097 -0.096 -0.099 
      
(0.112) (0.120) (0.125) (0.123) 
GDP Growth 
     
-1.178 -1.205 -4.137
***
 -4.159
***
 
      
(1.898) (1.884) (1.157) (1.168) 
State Capacity 
      
-28.404
*
 -29.021
*
 -28.593
*
 
       
(15.543) (15.388) (14.988) 
Cold War 
       
1.536
**
 1.538
**
 
        
(0.716) (0.715) 
Conflict 
        
-0.022 
         
(0.096) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 
       
4.549
***
 4.561
***
 
        
(1.447) (1.439) 
Growth * ln(T) 
     
-1.758
*
 -1.697
*
 
  
      
(0.947) 
 
(0.936) 
   
Page 59 of 87
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
9 
 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Cold War * ln(T) 
       
-1.006
***
 -1.008
***
 
        
(0.305) (0.303) 
Events 170 170 170 170 170 164 164 164 164 
Observations 3,152 3,152 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 
Log Likelihood -738.807 -738.775 -737.488 -736.042 -734.348 -690.648 -688.636 -684.157 -684.135 
LR Test 
9.015
***
  
(df = 1) 
9.078
**
  
(df = 2) 
11.653
***
  
(df = 3) 
14.545
***
  
(df = 4) 
17.933
***
  
(df = 5) 
38.294
***
  
(df = 8) 
42.319
***
  
(df = 9) 
51.277
***
  
(df = 11) 
51.321
***
  
(df = 12) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as 
a GDP share, standardised total and average migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged by one year. 
Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 4: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 3 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Autocratic Migration (Sum) -0.046 -0.016 -0.011 -0.025 -0.024 -0.053 -0.051 -0.07 -0.058 
Democratic Migration (Sum) 
 
-0.023 -0.026 -0.034 -0.034 -0.014 -0.028 -0.001 0.008 
Autocratic Distance (Sum) 
  
0.065 0.079 0.062 0.08 0.086 0.09 0.079 
Black Knight Migration (Sum) 
   
-0.054 -0.054 -0.05 -0.05 -0.037 -0.038 
Global Autocracies 
    
-0.005 -0.039 -0.041 0.174*** 0.177*** 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.055 -0.048 -0.089 -0.095 
GDP Growth 
     
-0.174** -0.168** -0.112 -0.097 
State Capacity 
      
0.007 0.043 0.04 
Cold War 
       
-0.207*** -0.205*** 
Conflict 
        
0.151 
Global Test 
 
0.302 1.151 3.107 3.163 8.51 8.314 22.511*** 24.476*** 
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Table 5: Alternative Diplomatic Exchange Model Specifications, Sum Aggregation 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Autocratic Diplomatic Ties (Sum) -0.175 -0.967
**
 -1.006
***
 -0.931
**
 -0.793
*
 -0.506
**
 -0.522
**
 -0.499
**
 
 
(0.110) (0.379) (0.385) (0.401) (0.405) (0.206) (0.217) (0.221) 
Democratic Diplomatic Ties (Sum) 
 
0.971
***
 0.996
***
 0.965
***
 0.825
***
 0.678
***
 0.629
***
 0.578
***
 
  
(0.241) (0.241) (0.239) (0.258) (0.188) (0.208) (0.178) 
Autocratic Distance (Sum) 
  
-0.102 -0.106 0.143 0.174
*
 0.160
*
 0.176
*
 
   
(0.148) (0.147) (0.090) (0.096) (0.094) (0.101) 
Black Knight Diplomatic Ties (Sum) 
   
-0.127 -0.132 -0.141 -0.157 -0.173 
    
(0.114) (0.113) (0.123) (0.128) (0.123) 
Global Autocracies 
    
-0.412 -0.749 -0.645 -6.227
**
 
     
(0.956) (0.988) (0.973) (2.515) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.134 -0.049 -0.058 
      
(0.100) (0.109) (0.111) 
GDP Growth 
     
0.880 0.836 0.421 
      
(2.150) (2.149) (2.225) 
State Capacity 
      
-42.223
*
 -43.703
**
 
       
(21.710) (21.767) 
Cold War 
       
1.024
**
 
        
(0.490) 
Autocratic Diplomatic Ties (Sum) * ln(T) 
 
0.222 0.245 0.229 0.190 
   
  
(0.169) (0.167) (0.172) (0.173) 
   
Democratic Diplomatic Ties (Sum) * ln(T) 
 
-0.312
***
 -0.336
***
 -0.328
***
 -0.283
**
 -0.173
***
 -0.196
***
 -0.181
***
 
  
(0.110) (0.107) (0.107) (0.111) (0.057) (0.060) (0.060) 
Autocratic Distance (Sum) * ln(T) 
  
0.118
*
 0.117
*
 
    
   
(0.066) 
 
(0.066) 
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Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 
       
3.168
***
 
        
(1.147) 
Growth * ln(T) 
     
-2.927
***
 -2.904
***
 -2.543
**
 
      
(1.000) (0.985) (1.006) 
Cold War * ln(T) 
       
-0.627
**
 
        
(0.263) 
Events 209 209 209 209 209 199 199 199 
Observations 3,916 3,916 3,915 3,915 3,915 3,737 3,737 3,737 
Log Likelihood -955.469 -949.420 -945.382 -944.844 -946.842 -881.954 -878.440 -873.607 
LR Test 
3.175
*
  
(df = 1) 
15.271
***
  
(df = 4) 
23.061
***
  
(df = 6) 
24.135
***
  
(df = 7) 
20.141
***
  
(df = 7) 
47.742
***
  
(df = 9) 
54.771
***
  
(df = 10) 
64.438
***
  
(df = 13) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as 
a GDP share, standardised total and average migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged by one year. 
Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
Table 6: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 5 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Autocratic Diplomatic (Sum) -0.086 0.162** 0.163** 0.152** 0.137** 0.091 0.095 0.067 
Democratic Diplomatic (Sum) 
 
-0.19*** -0.195*** -0.193*** -0.183*** -0.135** -0.137*** -0.135*** 
Autocratic Distance (Sum) 
  
0.176*** 0.175*** 0.11* 0.103* 0.113* 0.047 
Black Knight Diplomatic (Sum) 
   
0.044 0.043 0.098 0.098 0.125* 
Global Autocracies 
    
-0.009 -0.02 -0.019 0.141*** 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.069 -0.042 -0.037 
GDP Growth 
     
-0.209*** -0.196*** -0.167** 
State Capacity 
      
-0.033 -0.036 
Cold War 
       
-0.172*** 
Global Test 
 
13.945*** 16.304*** 16.087*** 16.123*** 23.402*** 25.341*** 37.875*** 
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Table 7: Alternative Trade Model Specifications, Average Aggregation 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Autocratic Trade (Mean) -0.826
**
 -0.861
**
 -0.756
**
 -1.313
***
 -1.322
***
 -1.365
***
 -1.445
***
 -1.513
***
 -1.573
***
 -1.576
***
 
 
(0.322) (0.344) (0.316) (0.423) (0.424) (0.437) (0.447) (0.457) (0.491) (0.485) 
Democratic Trade (Mean) 
 
0.034 0.023 0.021 0.031 0.034 -0.011 -0.013 0.206 0.206 
  
(0.149) (0.153) (0.196) (0.206) (0.218) (0.234) (0.241) (0.276) (0.276) 
Autocratic Distance (Mean) 
  
0.193
***
 0.201
***
 0.203
***
 0.233
***
 0.219
***
 0.225
***
 0.189
**
 0.188
**
 
   
(0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.081) (0.081) (0.083) (0.085) (0.085) 
Black Knight Trade (Mean) 
   
0.340
*
 0.336
*
 0.375
*
 0.421
**
 0.448
**
 0.477
**
 0.477
**
 
    
(0.199) (0.198) (0.196) (0.198) (0.201) (0.220) (0.221) 
Global Autocracies 
    
-0.175 -0.324 -0.409 -3.397
*
 -3.304 -3.323 
     
(0.712) (0.714) (0.718) (2.039) (2.053) (2.128) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.126 -0.076 -0.081 -0.014 -0.014 
      
(0.100) (0.108) (0.112) (0.106) (0.105) 
GDP Growth 
     
0.661 0.699 0.194 0.172 0.174 
      
(2.176) (2.145) (2.231) (2.240) (2.240) 
State Capacity 
      
-27.955
*
 -29.183
*
 -25.245 -25.268 
       
(16.758) (17.698) (15.971) (15.868) 
Cold War 
       
0.395 0.334 0.338 
        
(0.443) (0.439) (0.454) 
Resources 
        
-1.243
*
 -1.244
*
 
         
(0.747) (0.749) 
Oil Price 
         
0.0002 
          
(0.004) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 
       
2.257
**
 2.152
**
 2.153
**
 
        
(1.055) 
 
(1.048) 
 
(1.049) 
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Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Growth * ln(T) 
     
-2.438
**
 -2.409
**
 -1.995
**
 -2.115
**
 -2.116
**
 
      
(0.998) (0.985) (1.014) (1.046) (1.046) 
Cold War * ln(T) 
       
-0.421
*
 -0.413
*
 -0.414
*
 
        
(0.238) (0.234) (0.235) 
Events 209 209 209 202 202 200 200 200 200 200 
Observations 4,027 4,027 4,026 3,682 3,682 3,644 3,588 3,588 3,588 3,588 
Log Likelihood -959.375 -959.341 -954.792 -905.798 -905.766 -880.458 -877.058 -873.304 -871.194 -871.193 
LR Test 
13.739
***
  
(df = 1) 
13.808
***
  
(df = 2) 
22.605
***
  
(df = 3) 
28.169
***
  
(df = 4) 
28.233
***
  
(df = 5) 
51.064
***
  
(df = 8) 
53.171
***
  
(df = 9) 
60.679
***
  
(df = 12) 
64.899
***
  
(df = 13) 
64.901
***
  
(df = 14) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as 
a GDP share, standardised total and average migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged by one year. 
Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
Table 8: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 7 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Autocratic Trade (Mean) -0.011 -0.037 -0.053 -0.071 -0.06 -0.05 -0.051 -0.073 -0.086 -0.084 
Democratic Trade (Mean) 
 
0.076 0.084 0.074 0.046 0.035 0.037 0.042 0.078* 0.072* 
Autocratic Distance (Mean) 
  
0.038 0.043 0.016 0.005 0.004 0.019 0.002 -0.002 
Black Knight Trade (Mean) 
   
0.036 0.023 -0.017 -0.021 -0.015 0.006 -0.004 
Global Autocracies 
    
0.056 0.034 0.035 0.126** 0.112** 0.131** 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.032 -0.038 -0.057 -0.032 -0.026 
GDP Growth 
     
-0.186*** -0.184*** -0.141** -0.145** -0.15*** 
State Capacity 
      
0.071 0.062 0.082 0.059 
Cold War 
       
-0.124** -0.13** -0.147*** 
Resources 
        
-0.087 -0.078 
Oil Price 
         
-0.106 
Global Test 
 
1.482 2.365 2.566 3.32 11.42 11.652 16.372* 18.28* 20.551** 
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Table 9: Alternative Migration Model Specifications, Average Aggregation 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Autocratic Migration (Mean) -0.338
***
 -0.332
***
 -0.261
**
 -0.163 -0.166 -0.176 -0.227
*
 -0.237
*
 -0.240
*
 
 
(0.119) (0.122) (0.119) (0.112) (0.112) (0.117) (0.119) (0.122) (0.122) 
Democratic Migration (Mean) 
 
-0.060 -0.102 -0.101 -0.091 -0.057 -0.072 -0.067 -0.067 
  
(0.105) (0.118) (0.113) (0.114) (0.129) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) 
Autocratic Distance (Mean) 
  
0.155
*
 0.170
**
 0.185
**
 0.236
***
 0.221
**
 0.221
**
 0.222
**
 
   
(0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.089) (0.088) (0.091) (0.091) 
Black Knight Migration (Mean) 
   
-0.340 -0.365 -0.316 -0.298 -0.313 -0.312 
    
(0.323) (0.321) (0.307) (0.290) (0.295) (0.293) 
Global Autocracies 
    
-1.099 -1.101 -1.165 -7.335
**
 -7.350
**
 
     
(0.811) (0.817) (0.814) (3.281) (3.264) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.146 -0.098 -0.098 -0.099 
      
(0.110) (0.119) (0.124) (0.123) 
GDP Growth 
     
-1.327 -1.323 -4.151
***
 -4.162
***
 
      
(1.913) (1.902) (1.164) (1.174) 
State Capacity 
      
-27.362
*
 -27.761
*
 -27.534
*
 
       
(15.481) (15.669) (15.429) 
Cold War 
       
1.318
*
 1.318
*
 
        
(0.692) (0.692) 
Conflict 
        
-0.012 
         
(0.098) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 
       
4.276
***
 4.283
***
 
        
(1.421) (1.413) 
Growth * ln(T) 
     
-1.703
*
 -1.660
*
 
  
      
(0.952) 
 
(0.942) 
   
Page 65 of 87
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
15 
 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Cold War * ln(T) 
       
-0.946
***
 -0.947
***
 
        
(0.297) (0.295) 
Events 170 170 170 170 170 164 164 164 164 
Observations 3,152 3,152 3,150 3,148 3,148 3,049 3,049 3,049 3,049 
Log Likelihood -739.149 -738.979 -736.859 -734.919 -734.093 -690.633 -688.802 -684.312 -684.305 
LR Test 
8.331
***
  
(df = 1) 
8.670
**
  
(df = 2) 
12.911
***
  
(df = 3) 
16.309
***
  
(df = 4) 
17.962
***
  
(df = 5) 
37.952
***
  
(df = 8) 
41.612
***
  
(df = 9) 
50.593
***
  
(df = 11) 
50.606
***
  
(df = 12) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as 
a GDP share, standardised total and average migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged by one year. 
Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
Table 10: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 9 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Autocratic Migration (Mean) -0.061 -0.043 -0.047 -0.067 -0.066 -0.099 -0.097 -0.11 -0.096 
Democratic Migration (Mean) 
 
0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.013 -0.002 0.029 0.04 
Autocratic Distance (Mean) 
  
0.015 0.029 0.021 0.029 0.034 0.051 0.044 
Black Knight Migration (Mean) 
   
-0.053 -0.051 -0.048 -0.047 -0.036 -0.037 
Global Autocracies 
    
0.035 0 0.005 0.205*** 0.203*** 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.038 -0.034 -0.081 -0.09 
GDP Growth 
     
-0.16** -0.156** -0.103 -0.088 
State Capacity 
      
0.009 0.044 0.039 
Cold War 
       
-0.206*** -0.203*** 
Conflict 
        
0.163 
Global Test 
 
0.289 0.42 2.383 2.442 7.278 6.982 19.799** 22.265** 
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Table 11: Alternative Diplomatic Exchange Model Specifications, Average Aggregation 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Autocratic Diplomatic Ties (Mean) 0.368
*
 -0.319
**
 -0.134 0.467
**
 0.431
**
 0.323 0.399
*
 0.294 
 
(0.219) (0.162) (0.169) (0.238) (0.218) (0.238) (0.241) (0.248) 
Democratic Diplomatic Ties (Mean) 
 
0.235
*
 0.041 0.007 0.049 0.109 -0.003 -0.003 
  
(0.142) (0.147) (0.163) (0.165) (0.163) (0.161) (0.159) 
Autocratic Distance (Mean) 
  
0.205
**
 0.189
**
 0.190
**
 0.222
**
 0.216
**
 0.222
**
 
   
(0.081) (0.084) (0.085) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) 
Black Knight Diplomatic Ties (Mean) 
   
-0.278 -0.253 -0.219 -0.246 -0.069 
    
(0.185) (0.180) (0.205) (0.223) (0.148) 
Global Autocracies 
    
-2.123 -0.598 -0.453 -4.657
**
 
     
(1.440) (0.739) (0.732) (2.064) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
-0.139 -0.061 -0.071 
      
(0.097) (0.105) (0.109) 
GDP Growth 
     
0.825 0.832 0.663 
      
(2.203) (2.191) (2.171) 
State Capacity 
      
-46.764
**
 -46.893
**
 
       
(23.507) (23.415) 
Cold War 
       
0.680 
        
(0.441) 
Autocratic Diplomatic Ties (Mean) * ln(T) -0.226
**
 
  
-0.303
***
 -0.315
***
 -0.282
***
 -0.303
***
 -0.236
***
 
 
(0.097) 
  
(0.084) (0.085) (0.086) (0.091) (0.091) 
Black Knight Diplomatic Ties (Sum) * ln(T) 
   
0.149
*
 0.153
*
 0.107 0.094 
 
    
(0.083) (0.084) (0.090) (0.095) 
 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 
    
0.931
*
 
  
2.678
**
 
     
(0.548) 
  
(1.100) 
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Autocratic Breakdown 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Growth * ln(T) -2.887
***
 -2.880
***
 -2.619
***
 
      
(1.044) (1.027) (1.014) 
Cold War * ln(T) 
       
-0.512
**
 
        
(0.251) 
Events 209 209 209 209 209 199 199 199 
Observations 3,916 3,916 3,915 3,915 3,915 3,737 3,737 3,737 
Log Likelihood -952.917 -955.396 -950.956 -947.043 -945.757 -881.973 -878.098 -874.497 
LR Test 
8.277
**
  
(df = 2) 
3.320  
(df = 2) 
11.912
***
  
(df = 3) 
19.739
***
  
(df = 6) 
22.311
***
  
(df = 8) 
47.705
***
  
(df = 10) 
55.454
***
  
(df = 11) 
62.656
***
  
(df = 13) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as 
a GDP share, standardised total and average migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged by one year. 
Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
Table 12: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 11 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Autocratic Diplomatic (Mean) -0.167*** -0.142* -0.147* -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.098** 
Democratic Diplomatic (Mean) 
 
-0.038 0.001 0.097 0.038 0.035 0 -0.001 
Autocratic Distance (Mean) 
  
-0.025 0.011 -0.009 -0.022 -0.019 0 
Black Knight Diplomatic (Mean) 
   
0.124*** 0.123*** 0.086** 0.085** 0.074* 
Global Autocracies 
    
0.135** 0.092 0.105 0.212*** 
GDP per capita (ln) 
     
0.002 0.015 -0.008 
GDP Growth 
     
-0.213*** -0.205*** -0.19*** 
State Capacity 
      
-0.026 -0.007 
Cold War 
       
-0.173*** 
Global Test 
 
7.9** 7.213* 14.728*** 18.703*** 22.836*** 24.294*** 31.947*** 
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 Alternative Dependent Variable: Autocratic Ruling Coalitions 5
We rerun our primary models using as dependent variable a different measure of autocratic 
survival, Milan Svolik’s (2012) autocratic ruling coalitions. Svolik follows an approach 
similar to the one applied by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), the source for our original 
dependent variable, in that he captures autocratic survival and breakdown below the level of 
democratisation. According to Svolik, autocratic ruling coalitions endure as long as new 
rulers are affiliated with previous ones. Affiliated rulers are members of the same 
government, ruling party, family, or military junta as their predecessors (Svolik 2012, 42). 
Consequently, one autocratic ruling coalition can be replaced by another and, similarly to the 
coding by Geddes et al. (2014), autocratic collapse is not synonymous with democratisation.  
Table 13 replicates the six models reported in the paper (including a one-year time-lag) using 
the breakdown of autocratic ruling coalitions as dependent variables, while Table 15 reruns 
the same specifications without time-lags. (Tables 14 and 16 give the respective proportional 
hazards tests.) The results confirm the findings of the article to large extent, however not as 
consistent as in the original models. The three sum indicators significantly lower the risk of 
autocratic ruling coalitions breakdown in the model without and with a one-year time-lag, 
albeit the effect of migration and diplomatic linkage appears to weaken over time (indicated 
by the positive time-interaction term). The average-based indicators are not as consistent. 
While average migration and trade linkage are negatively associated with autocratic ruling 
coalition breakdown, the coefficients are not significant, and in the case of average migration 
linkage in the model with a one-year lag the effect reverses over time (indicated by the 
positive and significant time-interactive term). Whereas average diplomatic linkage is 
significantly negative in the model without lags, it becomes negative and significant only 
over time in the lagged model, but is positive in the beginning.  
Table 13: Autocratic Linkage and Ruling Coalition Breakdown, One-year Lag 
 
Autocratic Ruling Coalition Breakdown 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -2.539
*
 -0.935
*
 -4.410
**
 -0.735 -0.418 2.138
**
 
 
(1.343) (0.512) (1.863) (0.698) (0.317) (1.015) 
Democratic Linkage 0.633
***
 -0.358 0.918
***
 -0.960 -0.293 -5.091
***
 
 
(0.180) (0.324) (0.309) (0.813) (0.295) (1.415) 
Autocratic Distance 0.306
***
 0.525
***
 0.281
*
 0.767
***
 0.654
***
 0.479
***
 
 
(0.110) (0.166) (0.149) (0.275) (0.191) (0.139) 
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Autocratic Ruling Coalition Breakdown 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Black Knight Linkage -0.807 -0.150 -4.935
*
 0.597 -0.418 -9.668
***
 
 
(0.592) (0.180) (2.614) (1.668) (0.425) (3.244) 
Global Autocracies -2.067 -11.083 0.019 -3.621 -3.931 -0.307 
 
(8.970) (7.089) (8.986) (9.997) (7.721) (7.807) 
GDP per capita (ln) 1.986
***
 1.452
***
 2.074
***
 2.084
***
 1.392
***
 2.458
***
 
 
(0.498) (0.363) (0.756) (0.594) (0.408) (0.428) 
GDP Growth -4.270 -2.175 -5.035 -1.105 -1.512 -4.732
*
 
 
(3.816) (4.578) (5.046) (5.913) (4.324) (2.774) 
State Capacity -183.632
***
 -92.157
*
 -310.482
**
 -163.168
*
 -73.035 -477.335
***
 
 
(67.285) (47.869) (139.872) (85.551) (49.422) (129.600) 
Cold War 0.024 -0.933 0.248 -0.243 0.063 1.255
*
 
 
(0.498) (0.593) (0.392) (0.985) (0.447) (0.649) 
Resources -6.626
***
 
  
-5.226
*
 
  
 
(1.898) 
  
(2.918) 
  
Oil Price -0.004 
  
-0.005 
  
 
(0.005) 
  
(0.006) 
  
Conflict 
 
-1.132 
  
-0.900 
 
  
(0.695) 
  
(0.761) 
 
Autocratic Linkage * ln(T) 
 
0.468
***
 1.206
*
 
 
0.324
***
 -1.324
***
 
  
(0.160) (0.655) 
 
(0.113) (0.453) 
Democratic Linkage * ln(T) 
   
0.488
*
 
 
2.468
***
 
    
(0.289) 
 
(0.564) 
Autocratic Distance * ln(T) -0.051 -0.009 -0.062 -0.148 -0.009 -0.090 
 
(0.068) (0.093) (0.079) (0.137) (0.106) (0.062) 
Black Knight Linkage * ln(T) 
  
1.638
**
 -0.605 
 
3.374
***
 
   
(0.751) (0.634) 
 
(1.130) 
GDP per capita (ln) * ln(T) -0.967
***
 -0.886
***
 -0.968
***
 -1.099
***
 -0.866
***
 -1.147
***
 
 
(0.228) (0.164) (0.314) (0.282) (0.163) (0.197) 
GDP Growth * ln(T) -0.325 -1.346 -0.283 -1.332 -1.658 -0.190 
 
(1.995) (1.502) (2.231) (2.224) (1.422) (1.424) 
State Capacity * ln(T) 48.929
***
 23.355 83.958
**
 44.367
*
 17.933 130.508
***
 
 
(18.599) (14.856) (39.253) (24.060) (16.177) (34.358) 
Cold War * ln(T) 
 
0.319
*
 
 
0.084 
 
-0.521
**
 
  
(0.192) 
 
(0.307) 
 
(0.221) 
Resources * ln(T) 2.277
***
 
  
1.919
**
 
  
 
(0.623) 
  
(0.920) 
  
Conflict * ln(T) 
 
0.404
*
 
  
0.331 
 
  
(0.233) 
  
(0.254) 
 
Events 144 103 138 136 103 138 
Observations 3,961 3,093 3,803 3,621 3,084 3,803 
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Autocratic Ruling Coalition Breakdown 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Log Likelihood -519.682 -339.770 -492.517 -470.109 -336.774 -470.220 
LR Test 
333.670
***
 
(df = 16) 
241.406
***
 
(df = 17) 
315.900
***
 
(df = 15) 
332.379
***
 
(df = 19) 
247.250
***
 
(df = 16) 
360.495
***
 
(df = 17) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage 
indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total and average 
migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged 
by one year. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 14: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 13 
 
Trade (Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade (Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage 0.022 0.366*** 0.135** -0.048 0.325*** -0.132** 
Democratic Linkage 0.017 -0.013 -0.1 0.189*** 0.025 0.149** 
Autocratic Distance 0.125*** 0.256*** 0.138*** 0.172*** 0.263*** 0.169*** 
Black Knight Linkage 0.033 -0.099 0.245*** 0.118*** -0.013 0.148** 
Global Autocracies 0.031 -0.101 -0.006 0.039 0.054 0.056 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.153*** -0.267*** -0.202*** -0.2*** -0.28*** -0.18*** 
GDP Growth -0.221*** -0.326*** -0.225*** -0.22*** -0.318*** -0.226*** 
State Capacity 0.152*** 0.172*** 0.157*** 0.214*** 0.159** 0.179*** 
Cold War -0.043 -0.103*** -0.063 -0.096*** -0.012 -0.105*** 
Resources 0.177*** 
  
0.105*** 
  
Oil Price -0.06 
  
0.02 
  
Conflict 
 
0.164** 
  
0.21** 
 
Global Test 52.035*** 118.091*** 54.703*** 90.942*** 116.952*** 65.979*** 
 
Table 15: Autocratic Linkage and Ruling Coalition Breakdown, No Time-Lags 
 
Autocratic Ruling Coalition Breakdown 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -1.588
**
 -0.803
*
 -3.695
***
 -0.461 -0.321 -0.813
***
 
 
(0.646) (0.486) (1.197) (0.432) (0.336) (0.280) 
Democratic Linkage 0.529
***
 -1.200
*
 -0.536 -1.347 -0.197 -0.046 
 
(0.135) (0.659) (1.748) (0.882) (0.150) (0.361) 
Autocratic Distance 0.240
**
 0.256
**
 0.230
***
 0.596
***
 0.506
***
 0.122 
 
(0.111) (0.114) (0.079) (0.123) (0.150) (0.267) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.180 -0.752 -1.649
*
 0.043 -15.671 -2.819
*
 
 
(0.181) (0.621) (0.873) (0.767) (13.025) (1.514) 
Global Autocracies 22.832
***
 10.439
**
 23.671
***
 21.857
***
 13.249
***
 72.635
***
 
 
(5.076) 
 
(4.549) 
 
(4.741) 
 
(4.567) 
 
(4.270) 
 
(9.952) 
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Autocratic Ruling Coalition Breakdown 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
GDP per capita (ln) 1.883
***
 1.609
***
 2.039
***
 1.836
***
 1.709
***
 1.863
***
 
 
(0.344) (0.316) (0.284) (0.253) (0.304) (0.373) 
GDP Growth -0.118 -2.055 1.196 1.876 0.459 6.304
***
 
 
(1.529) (2.061) (1.748) (1.727) (2.538) (2.242) 
State Capacity -19.377 -19.000 -341.532
***
 -157.725
**
 -7.660 -172.440
***
 
 
(13.600) (16.290) (91.658) (64.291) (10.620) (65.881) 
Cold War -1.101
***
 -1.690
***
 -0.220 -0.604 -1.259
***
 -2.362
***
 
 
(0.194) (0.447) (0.541) (0.511) (0.465) (0.727) 
Resources -8.808
***
 
  
-1.140 
  
 
(1.913) 
  
(0.702) 
  
Oil Price -0.019
***
 
  
-0.014
***
 
  
 
(0.005) 
  
(0.004) 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.558
*
 
  
-0.352 
 
  
(0.291) 
  
(0.396) 
 
Autocratic Linkage * ln(T) 
 
0.328
*
 1.009
**
 
 
0.175 
 
  
(0.183) (0.436) 
 
(0.169) 
 
Democratic Linkage * ln(T) 
 
0.467
**
 0.308 0.618
**
 
  
  
(0.221) (0.650) (0.308) 
  
Autocratic Distance * ln(T) 0.059 0.070 0.014 -0.114
*
 -0.015 0.040 
 
(0.065) (0.048) (0.053) (0.064) (0.065) (0.108) 
Black Knight Linkage * ln(T) 
  
0.648
**
 0.006 4.231 1.136
**
 
   
(0.303) (0.297) (3.476) (0.522) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 
     
-30.690
***
 
      
(2.790) 
GDP per capita (ln) * ln(T) -0.903
***
 -0.876
***
 -0.884
***
 -0.886
***
 -0.849
***
 -0.718
***
 
 
(0.111) (0.130) (0.101) (0.096) (0.130) (0.152) 
GDP Growth * ln(T) -0.942 0.047 -1.517
*
 -1.602
**
 -0.969 -4.083
***
 
 
(0.749) (1.060) (0.789) (0.784) (1.181) (1.043) 
State Capacity * ln(T) 
  
89.760
***
 46.833
***
 
 
43.042
**
 
   
(23.709) (18.035) 
 
(17.889) 
Cold War * ln(T) 
 
0.150 -0.333 -0.177 0.092 0.859
***
 
  
(0.165) (0.255) (0.227) (0.174) (0.278) 
Resources * ln(T) 2.668
***
 
     
 
(0.565) 
     
Conflict * ln(T) 
 
0.166 
  
0.116 
 
  
(0.113) 
  
(0.152) 
 
Events 236 170 228 232 170 228 
Observations 3,961 3,093 3,803 3,621 3,084 3,803 
Log Likelihood 
 
-859.225 
 
-590.152 
 
-811.238 
 
-821.504 
 
-582.575 
 
-634.680 
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Autocratic Ruling Coalition Breakdown 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
LR Test 
507.474
***
 
(df = 15) 
315.587
***
 
(df = 17) 
501.490
***
 
(df = 17) 
507.639
***
 
(df = 18) 
329.213
***
 
(df = 17) 
854.604
***
 
(df = 16) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage 
indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total and average 
migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. Significance levels: * < 
.1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 16: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 15 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage 0.028 0.225*** 0.175*** -0.098 0.177*** 0.037 
Democratic Linkage -0.016 0.149** -0.15*** 0.102*** 0.144* -0.053 
Autocratic Distance 0.195*** 0.231*** 0.243*** 0.122*** 0.169*** 0.179*** 
Black Knight Linkage 0.126 0.155* 0.127*** 0.197*** 0.145** 0.101** 
Global Autocracies 0.073 -0.028 0.05 0.08 0.068 0.131*** 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.222*** -0.227*** -0.256*** -0.184*** -0.206*** -0.232*** 
GDP Growth -0.248*** -0.301*** -0.331*** -0.249*** -0.278*** -0.33*** 
State Capacity 0.095 -0.002 0.134** 0.155*** -0.013 0.158*** 
Cold War -0.098 -0.184*** -0.223*** -0.111** -0.154** -0.215*** 
Resources 0.235*** 
  
0.064 
  
Oil Price -0.091 
  
0.059 
  
Conflict 
 
0.319*** 
  
0.255*** 
 
Global Test 60.651*** 70.38*** 113.499*** 53.221*** 51.615*** 97.37*** 
 
 Alternative Dependent Variable: Democratisation  6
Democratisation can be understood as a particular form of autocratic breakdown. It is a very 
demanding form of autocratic breakdown which requires a complex set of facilitating 
conditions. Our theory is much more modest than claiming autocratic linkage had an effect 
on this complex phenomenon. However if it did, such evidence would provide very strong 
indirect support of our argument, given that autocratic regime breakdown is a necessary 
condition for democratisation. Tables 17 and 19 presents the findings of six democratisation 
models each, based on the template of control variables presented in the article. The former 
includes no time lag, the latter a one-year lag. Autocratic linkage has a significant negative 
effect in almost all models, reducing the likelihood of democratisation, thus strongly 
supporting our argument.  
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Table 17: Autocratic Linkage and Democratisation, No Time-lags 
 
Democratisation 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -1.266 -1.752
**
 -1.227
***
 -1.523
*
 -1.718
**
 -0.661 
 
(0.809) (0.714) (0.464) (0.863) (0.696) (0.434) 
Democratic Linkage -0.053 -0.076 0.320 -0.172 0.029 0.115 
 
(0.311) (0.187) (0.347) (0.362) (0.190) (0.294) 
Autocratic Distance 0.516
***
 0.420
**
 0.493
***
 0.405
***
 0.303
**
 0.400
***
 
 
(0.157) (0.199) (0.158) (0.123) (0.153) (0.123) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.239 -0.452 -0.250 0.423 -0.392 -1.532 
 
(0.353) 
 
 
(0.439) 
 
 
(0.240) 
 
 
(0.386) 
 
 
(0.461) 
 
 
(1.644) 
 
 
Global Autocracies -11.394
***
 -14.446
**
 -8.113 -5.962
*
 -11.895
*
 3.094 
 
(3.666) (6.730) (4.943) (3.082) (6.429) (2.196) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.359
*
 0.343
*
 0.320
*
 0.351
**
 0.357
*
 0.341
**
 
 
(0.184) (0.201) (0.170) (0.179) (0.194) (0.167) 
GDP Growth -4.174
***
 -4.850
***
 -4.972
***
 -3.952
***
 -4.827
***
 -4.953
***
 
 
(1.491) (1.710) (1.537) (1.517) (1.693) (1.564) 
State Capacity -12.231 -23.169 -20.077 -13.586 -21.008 -22.963 
 
(9.623) (15.926) (13.258) (10.999) (15.503) (15.514) 
Cold War 1.701 2.037 1.479 0.746 1.762 -0.797 
 
(1.273) (1.863) (1.615) (1.179) (1.814) (1.043) 
Resources -1.321 
  
-1.110 
  
 
(1.489) 
  
(1.558) 
  
Oil Price 0.011
*
 
  
0.012
*
 
  
 
(0.006) 
  
(0.006) 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.228 
  
-0.207 
 
  
(0.221) 
  
(0.220) 
 
Black Knight Linkage * ln(T) 
     
0.358 
      
(0.537) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 4.321
***
 4.939
**
 3.740
**
 3.195
**
 4.469
*
 
 
 
(1.418) (2.454) (1.683) (1.392) (2.423) 
 
Cold * ln(T) -1.225
**
 -1.424
**
 -1.177
**
 -0.925
**
 -1.340
**
 -0.406 
 
(0.496) (0.689) (0.577) (0.460) (0.673) (0.361) 
Events 70 58 66 70 58 66 
Observations 3,913 3,051 3,738 3,589 3,049 3,738 
Log Likelihood -271.748 -194.915 -251.145 -266.587 -195.864 -251.591 
LR Test 
55.560
***
 
(df = 13) 
68.300
***
 
(df = 12) 
54.061
***
 
(df = 11) 
55.300
***
 
(df = 13) 
66.267
***
 
(df = 12) 
53.169
***
 
(df = 11) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage 
indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total and average 
migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. Significance levels: * < 
.1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
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Table 18: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 17 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade  
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -0.108 0.02 -0.12 -0.095 0.043 -0.34* 
Democratic Linkage 0.034 0.055 0.118 0.065 0.108 0.29 
Autocratic Distance 0.063 0.073 0.035 0.051 0.068 0.125 
Black Knight Linkage 0.187* -0.135 0.221 0.177* -0.137 0.258** 
Global Autocracies 0.315*** 0.179** 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.192** 0.173 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.061 -0.121 -0.174* -0.035 -0.125 -0.197* 
GDP Growth -0.098 0.04 0.044 -0.072 0.011 -0.062 
State Capacity -0.283 -0.252 -0.124 -0.239 -0.219 -0.116 
Cold War -0.33*** -0.272*** -0.298*** -0.275*** -0.264*** -0.252*** 
Resources -0.022 
  
-0.026 
  
Oil Price -0.165 
  
-0.132 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.111 
  
-0.091 
 
Global Test 23.917** 15.157 17.79** 14.737 13.616 16.808* 
 
Table 19: Autocratic Linkage and Democratisation, One-year Lag 
 
Democratisation 
 
Trade (Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -1.076 -1.144
**
 -1.194
**
 -1.261
**
 -1.112
**
 0.612 
 
(0.745) (0.509) (0.469) (0.632) (0.510) (0.474) 
Democratic Linkage 0.012 -0.246 0.358 0.003 -0.133 0.190 
 
(0.264) (0.184) (0.321) (0.324) (0.180) (0.317) 
 
Autocratic Distance 
 
0.474
***
 
 
0.506
***
 
 
0.474
***
 
 
0.330
***
 
 
0.373
**
 
 
0.350
***
 
 
(0.150) (0.186) (0.149) (0.124) (0.151) (0.113) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.358 -1.128 -0.361 0.482 -1.286 -2.913
*
 
 
(0.378) (1.343) (0.305) (0.361) (1.482) (1.490) 
Global Autocracies -12.079
**
 -1.610 -7.935 -7.949 0.805 2.937 
 
(5.716) (3.147) (7.371) (5.434) (2.829) (2.277) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.233 0.203 0.223 0.233 0.214 0.296
*
 
 
(0.175) (0.194) (0.164) (0.177) (0.191) (0.165) 
GDP Growth -4.305
**
 -5.878
***
 -5.623
***
 -3.864
*
 -5.659
***
 -5.906
***
 
 
(1.902) (2.088) (1.978) (2.018) (2.113) (2.131) 
State Capacity -10.239 -22.900 -21.307 -10.371 -19.952 -32.535 
 
(10.092) (16.775) (14.300) (10.820) (15.656) (23.833) 
Cold War 2.043 -0.960 1.714 1.248 -1.078 -1.212
**
 
 
(1.483) (0.742) (1.693) (1.372) (0.717) (0.559) 
Resources -2.301
*
 
  
-2.417
*
 
  
 
(1.220) 
  
(1.296) 
  
Oil Price 0.031
*
 
  
0.035
**
 
  
 
(0.017) 
  
(0.016) 
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Democratisation 
 
Trade (Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Conflict 
 
-0.247 
  
-0.209 
 
  
(0.168) 
  
(0.169) 
 
Autocratic Linkage * ln(T) 
     
-0.674
***
 
      
(0.176) 
Black Knight Linkage * ln(T) 
     
0.938
**
 
      
(0.474) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 4.354
**
 
 
3.595 3.696
*
 
  
 
(2.049) 
 
(2.505) (1.990) 
  
Cold * ln(T) -1.063
*
 
 
-1.064
*
 -0.833
*
 
  
 
(0.556) 
 
(0.623) (0.506) 
  
Oil Price * ln(T) -0.012
**
 
  
-0.013
**
 
  
 
(0.006) 
  
(0.006) 
  
Events 72 58 68 72 58 68 
Observations 3,896 3,039 3,721 3,572 3,037 3,721 
Log Likelihood -285.434 -205.553 -263.543 -280.937 -207.399 -261.536 
LR Test 
46.059
***
 
(df = 14) 
47.169
***
 
(df = 10) 
46.697
***
 
(df = 11) 
44.352
***
 
(df = 14) 
43.256
***
 
(df = 10) 
50.711
***
 
(df = 11) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage 
indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total and average 
migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged 
by one year. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 20: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 19 
 
Trade (Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade (Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage 0.12 -0.064 -0.141 -0.044 -0.082 -0.322** 
Democratic Linkage -0.075 0.081 0.016 0.022 0.056 0.19 
Autocratic Distance -0.052 -0.052 -0.075 -0.056 -0.091 -0.034 
Black Knight Linkage -0.099 -0.151 0.153 -0.035 -0.138 0.256** 
Global Autocracies 0.296*** 0.179* 0.234** 0.228** 0.128 0.134 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.092 -0.006 0.022 0.105 0.002 0.058 
GDP Growth -0.063 0.057 -0.127 -0.051 0.021 -0.175* 
State Capacity -0.28 -0.242 -0.165 -0.262 -0.252 -0.098 
Cold War -0.253*** -0.163* -0.227*** -0.182** -0.138 -0.145 
Resources -0.122 
  
-0.13 
  
Oil Price -0.275** 
  
-0.22** 
  
Conflict 
 
0.139 
  
0.136 
 
Global Test 16.574 6.991 10.817 10.932 6.567 12.907 
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 Multicollinear Models Including All Linkage Dimensions 7
We do not present a model including all linkage dimensions in the article. Such a model 
would run counter to our understanding of the linkage indicators as proxies for autocratic 
linkages in general. We are less interested in the effects of, for example, trade linkage versus 
migration linkage – which a model controlling one for the other would imply. Rather, we see 
all indicators as equally valid indicators of autocratic linkages in general. The exception here 
is proximity linkage, which is both a driver of linkages in other spheres, and a linkage 
indicator in its own right. We therefore include it as a control vis-à-vis the indicators of trade, 
migration, and diplomatic linkage.  
However, to demonstrate we do not avoid a model including all linkage dimensions because 
of unfavourable results, we show in Table 21 below that findings are reasonably supportive 
of our argument. Autocratic linkage by trade and diplomatic ties continue to display 
significant effects in reducing the likelihood of autocratic breakdown. The lack of 
significance of the migration an distance indicators is likely to be due to multicollinearity – a 
further technical argument to not include the indicators in the same model.  
Table 21: Models Including All Linkage Dimensions 
 
Autocratic Breakdown 
 
Sum Linkage Indicators Average Linkage Indicators 
Autocratic Trade -1.908
***
 -1.835
***
 
 
(0.632) (0.585) 
Autocratic Migration -0.169 -0.138 
 
(0.128) (0.126) 
Autocratic Diplomatic Ties -0.384
*
 -0.455
*
 
 
(0.214) (0.249) 
Autocratic Distance 0.143 0.137 
 
(0.123) (0.101) 
Democratic Trade 0.329 -0.615 
 
(0.214) (0.559) 
Democratic Migration -0.171 -0.086 
 
(0.197) (0.168) 
Democratic Diplomatic Ties 0.128 0.223 
 
(0.197) (0.212) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.387 0.477 
 
(0.261) (0.293) 
Global Autocracies -6.490
*
 -5.186 
 
(3.767) 
 
(3.747) 
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Autocratic Breakdown 
 
Sum Linkage Indicators Average Linkage Indicators 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.130 0.081 
 
(0.149) (0.148) 
GDP Growth -5.172
***
 -5.041
***
 
 
(1.146) (1.280) 
State Capacity -46.636
*
 -47.182
*
 
 
(25.179) (25.074) 
Cold War 1.260 1.049 
 
(0.771) (0.761) 
Resources -1.120 -1.145 
 
(0.709) (0.732) 
Oil Price 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Conflict 0.014 -0.476 
 
(0.110) (0.302) 
Democratic Trade * ln(T) 
 
0.353
**
 
  
(0.157) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 4.309
***
 3.437
**
 
 
(1.487) (1.526) 
Cold * ln(T) -0.938
***
 -0.830
***
 
 
(0.307) (0.307) 
Conflict * ln(T) 
 
0.213
**
 
  
(0.103) 
Events 162 158 
Observations 3,019 2,798 
Log Likelihood -663.975 -633.365 
LR Test 67.992
***
 (df = 18) 71.106
***
 (df = 20) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All 
covariates lagged by one year. All covariates lagged by one year. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
 
Table 22: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 21 
 
Sum Linkage Indicators Average Linkage Indicators 
Autocratic Trade 0.02 -0.063 
Autocratic Migration -0.016 -0.014 
Autocratic Diplomatic Ties 0.02 -0.067 
Autocratic Distance 0.061 0.019 
Democratic Trade 0.052 0.102* * 
Democratic Migration 0.04 0.051 
Democratic Diplomatic Ties -0.007 0 
Black Knight Linkage 0.073 0.115* 
Global Autocracies 0.174* * * 0.127* * 
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Sum Linkage Indicators Average Linkage Indicators 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.091 -0.041 
GDP Growth -0.048 -0.018 
State Capacity 0.004 0 
Cold War -0.19* * * -0.165* * * 
Resources -0.032 -0.074 
Oil Price -0.081 -0.055 
Conflict 0.147* 0.152* * 
Global Test 21.767 22.521 
 
 Time-Lags 8
The following five tables report the full models behind Table 2 in the article, in which only 
coefficients of autocratic linkage indicators are shown and control variables omitted. Most 
linkage indicators are significant in models up to a four-year time-lag. The two trade 
indicators lose significant in the five-year model. The only exception here are the indicators 
of diplomatic linkage, which retain their negative sign, indicating that lower risks of 
autocratic breakdown are associated with higher levels of diplomatic autocratic linkage, but 
the effect is statistically significant only in the models with no lags and a one-year lag 
(presented in the article).   
Table 23: Autocratic Linkage and Regime Survival, No Time-lags 
 
No Time Lags 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Autocratic Linkage -1.846
***
 -0.358
**
 -0.707
***
 -1.846
***
 -0.358
**
 -0.707
***
 
 
(0.699) (0.160) (0.238) (0.699) (0.160) (0.238) 
Democratic Linkage 0.377
***
 -0.100 0.263 0.377
***
 -0.100 0.263 
 
(0.136) (0.144) (0.198) (0.136) (0.144) (0.198) 
Autocratic Distance 0.253
***
 0.286
***
 0.257
***
 0.253
***
 0.286
***
 0.257
***
 
 
(0.094) (0.102) (0.099) (0.094) (0.102) (0.099) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.214 -0.054 0.141
*
 0.214 -0.054 0.141
*
 
 
(0.273) (0.130) (0.085) (0.273) (0.130) (0.085) 
Global Autocracies -7.774
***
 -12.128
***
 -7.189
**
 -7.774
***
 -12.128
***
 -7.189
**
 
 
(2.528) (3.997) (2.892) (2.528) (3.997) (2.892) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.042 0.042 0.190 0.042 0.042 0.190 
 
(0.114) (0.245) (0.231) (0.114) (0.245) (0.231) 
GDP Growth -5.476
***
 -4.380
***
 -5.762
***
 -5.476
***
 -4.380
***
 -5.762
***
 
 
(1.013) (1.186) (0.970) (1.013) (1.186) (0.970) 
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No Time Lags 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State Capacity -29.070
**
 -30.112
*
 -39.616
*
 -29.070
**
 -30.112
*
 -39.616
*
 
 
(14.433) (17.666) (20.939) (14.433) (17.666) (20.939) 
Cold War 1.204
**
 2.131
**
 1.260
*
 1.204
**
 2.131
**
 1.260
*
 
 
(0.599) (0.968) (0.684) (0.599) (0.968) (0.684) 
Resources -1.220 
  
-1.220 
  
 
(0.795) 
  
(0.795) 
  
Oil Price 0.006 
  
0.006 
  
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
Conflict 
 
0.019 
  
0.019 
 
  
(0.080) 
  
(0.080) 
 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 3.263
***
 5.280
***
 3.234
***
 3.263
***
 5.280
***
 3.234
***
 
 
(1.087) (1.592) (1.164) (1.087) (1.592) (1.164) 
GDP per capita (ln) * ln(T) 
 
-0.062 -0.124 
 
-0.062 -0.124 
  
(0.097) (0.089) 
 
(0.097) (0.089) 
Cold * ln(T) -0.705
**
 -1.207
***
 -0.689
**
 -0.705
**
 -1.207
***
 -0.689
**
 
 
(0.280) (0.378) (0.297) (0.280) (0.378) (0.297) 
Events 195 155 188 195 155 188 
Observations 3,913 3,051 3,738 3,913 3,051 3,738 
Log Likelihood -845.656 -634.609 -805.315 -845.656 -634.609 -805.315 
LR Test 
86.217
***
  
(df = 13) 
63.654
***
  
(df = 13) 
80.004
***
  
(df = 12) 
86.217
***
  
(df = 13) 
63.654
***
  
(df = 13) 
80.004
***
  
(df = 12) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage 
indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total and average 
migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. Significance levels: * < 
.1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 24: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 23 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade  
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage 0.003 -0.037 0.001 0.003 -0.037 0.001 
Democratic Linkage 0.05 0.13* -0.046 0.05 0.13* -0.046 
Autocratic Distance -0.023 0.032 0.013 -0.023 0.032 0.013 
Black Knight Linkage -0.02 0.002 0.023 -0.02 0.002 0.023 
Global Autocracies 0.15*** 0.222*** 0.154*** 0.15*** 0.222*** 0.154*** 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.101 -0.142** -0.104** -0.101 -0.142** -0.104** 
GDP Growth -0.021 0.007 -0.054 -0.021 0.007 -0.054 
State Capacity 0.043 -0.025 0.038 0.043 -0.025 0.038 
Cold War -0.151*** -0.232*** -0.17*** -0.151*** -0.232*** -0.17*** 
Resources 0.005 
  
0.005 
  
Oil Price -0.018 
  
-0.018 
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Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade  
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Conflict 
 
0.129 
  
0.129 
 
Global Test 18.211* 24.156*** 20.415** 18.211* 24.156*** 20.415** 
 
Table 25: Autocratic Linkage and Regime Survival, Two-year Lag 
 
Autocratic Breakdown, Two-year Lag 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Autocratic Linkage -1.285
***
 -0.255
**
 -0.295 -1.285
***
 -0.255
**
 -0.295 
 
(0.455) (0.123) (0.214) (0.455) (0.123) (0.214) 
Democratic Linkage 0.309
***
 -0.189 0.044 0.309
***
 -0.189 0.044 
 
(0.107) (0.163) (0.212) (0.107) (0.163) (0.212) 
Autocratic Distance 0.178
*
 0.199
**
 0.184
*
 0.178
*
 0.199
**
 0.184
*
 
 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.209 -0.231 0.515
**
 0.209 -0.231 0.515
**
 
 
(0.170) (0.233) (0.209) (0.170) (0.233) (0.209) 
Global Autocracies -6.383
***
 -7.805
**
 -9.080
***
 -6.383
***
 -7.805
**
 -9.080
***
 
 
(2.266) (3.499) (2.266) (2.266) (3.499) (2.266) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.071 -0.127 -0.095 -0.071 -0.127 -0.095 
 
(0.108) (0.124) (0.115) (0.108) (0.124) (0.115) 
GDP Growth -2.092
*
 -1.770 -2.307
**
 -2.092
*
 -1.770 -2.307
**
 
 
(1.123) (1.142) (1.131) (1.123) (1.142) (1.131) 
State Capacity -28.241
**
 -39.420
**
 -53.777
**
 -28.241
**
 -39.420
**
 -53.777
**
 
 
(12.296) (17.929) (23.293) (12.296) (17.929) (23.293) 
Cold War 0.959
**
 1.344
*
 1.498
***
 0.959
**
 1.344
*
 1.498
***
 
 
(0.427) (0.725) (0.412) (0.427) (0.725) (0.412) 
Resources -1.152
**
 
  
-1.152
**
 
  
 
(0.570) 
  
(0.570) 
  
Oil Price -0.002 
  
-0.002 
  
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.056 
  
-0.056 
 
  
(0.069) 
  
(0.069) 
 
Black Knight Linkage * ln(T) 
  
-0.496
**
 
  
-0.496
**
 
   
(0.212) 
  
(0.212) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 3.238
***
 3.360
**
 4.346
***
 3.238
***
 3.360
**
 4.346
***
 
 
(0.999) (1.597) (1.047) (0.999) (1.597) (1.047) 
Cold * ln(T) -0.552
**
 -0.668
**
 -0.789
***
 -0.552
**
 -0.668
**
 -0.789
***
 
 
(0.226) (0.337) (0.230) (0.226) (0.337) (0.230) 
Events 208 164 201 208 164 201 
Observations 3,912 3,051 3,737 3,912 3,051 3,737 
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Autocratic Breakdown, Two-year Lag 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Likelihood -935.411 -692.300 -889.499 -935.411 -692.300 -889.499 
LR Test 
47.947
***
 
(df = 13) 
31.878
***
 
(df = 12) 
54.620
***
 
(df = 12) 
47.947
***
 
(df = 13) 
31.878
***
 
(df = 12) 
54.620
***
 
(df = 12) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage 
indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total and average 
migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged 
by two years. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 26: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 25 
 
Trade (Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -0.057 -0.119 -0.001 -0.057 -0.119 -0.001 
Democratic Linkage 0.076 0.095 -0.076 0.076 0.095 -0.076 
Autocratic Distance 0.024 0.074 0.021 0.024 0.074 0.021 
Black Knight Linkage 0.094 -0.056 -0.188*** 0.094 -0.056 -0.188*** 
Global Autocracies 0.147** 0.137** 0.148*** 0.147** 0.137** 0.148*** 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.003 -0.076 0.027 -0.003 -0.076 0.027 
GDP Growth -0.038 -0.036 -0.009 -0.038 -0.036 -0.009 
State Capacity 0.056 0.138 -0.001 0.056 0.138 -0.001 
Cold War -0.138** -0.159*** -0.171*** -0.138** -0.159*** -0.171*** 
Resources -0.008 
  
-0.008 
  
Oil Price -0.075 
  
-0.075 
  
Conflict 
 
0.003 
  
0.003 
 
Global Test 12.544 12.168 29.887*** 12.544 12.168 29.887*** 
 
Table 27: Autocratic Linkage and Regime Survival, Three-year Lag 
 
Autocratic Breakdown, Three-year Lag 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Autocratic Linkage -1.330
***
 -0.311
**
 -0.187 -1.330
***
 -0.311
**
 -0.187 
 
(0.481) (0.136) (0.193) (0.481) (0.136) (0.193) 
Democratic Linkage 0.247
**
 -0.676
*
 -0.121 0.247
**
 -0.676
*
 -0.121 
 
(0.120) (0.372) (0.185) (0.120) (0.372) (0.185) 
Autocratic Distance 0.142 0.181
*
 0.179
*
 0.142 0.181
*
 0.179
*
 
 
(0.089) (0.096) (0.093) (0.089) (0.096) (0.093) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.305
*
 -0.035 0.070 0.305
*
 -0.035 0.070 
 
(0.179) (0.136) (0.094) (0.179) (0.136) (0.094) 
Global Autocracies -6.871
***
 -7.991
**
 -7.646
***
 -6.871
***
 -7.991
**
 -7.646
***
 
 
(1.904) (3.279) (2.286) (1.904) (3.279) (2.286) 
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Autocratic Breakdown, Three-year Lag 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.054 -0.100 -0.081 -0.054 -0.100 -0.081 
 
(0.103) (0.126) (0.106) (0.103) (0.126) (0.106) 
GDP Growth -0.452 0.159 -0.375 -0.452 0.159 -0.375 
 
(0.916) (1.166) (0.924) (0.916) (1.166) (0.924) 
State Capacity -37.062
**
 -37.501
**
 -54.583
**
 -37.062
**
 -37.501
**
 -54.583
**
 
 
(14.536) (15.485) (21.199) (14.536) (15.485) (21.199) 
Cold War 1.223
***
 1.423
**
 1.391
***
 1.223
***
 1.423
**
 1.391
***
 
 
(0.398) (0.658) (0.445) (0.398) (0.658) (0.445) 
Resources -0.964 
  
-0.964 
  
 
(0.636) 
  
(0.636) 
  
Oil Price 0.001 
  
0.001 
  
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.207
**
 
  
-0.207
**
 
 
  
(0.091) 
  
(0.091) 
 
Democratic Linkage * ln(T) 
 
0.173 
  
0.173 
 
  
(0.130) 
  
(0.130) 
 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 3.908
***
 3.895
***
 3.741
***
 3.908
***
 3.895
***
 3.741
***
 
 
(0.814) (1.391) (0.962) (0.814) (1.391) (0.962) 
Cold * ln(T) -0.702
***
 -0.789
***
 -0.677
***
 -0.702
***
 -0.789
***
 -0.677
***
 
 
(0.195) (0.283) (0.217) (0.195) (0.283) (0.217) 
Events 209 168 204 209 168 204 
Observations 3,912 3,051 3,737 3,912 3,051 3,737 
Log Likelihood -941.284 -711.229 -912.965 -941.284 -711.229 -912.965 
LR Test 
46.659
***
  
(df = 13) 
32.637
***
  
(df = 13) 
34.520
***
  
(df = 11) 
46.659
***
  
(df = 13) 
32.637
***
  
(df = 13) 
34.520
***
  
(df = 11) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage 
indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total and average 
migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged 
by three years. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 28: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 27 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade  
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -0.017 -0.066 -0.107 -0.017 -0.066 -0.107 
Democratic Linkage 0.025 0.159** 0.044 0.025 0.159** 0.044 
Autocratic Distance -0.008 0.057 -0.023 -0.008 0.057 -0.023 
Black Knight Linkage 0.047 -0.006 -0.048 0.047 -0.006 -0.048 
Global Autocracies 0.187*** 0.217*** 0.183*** 0.187*** 0.217*** 0.183*** 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.003 -0.098 0.019 0.003 -0.098 0.019 
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Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade  
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
GDP Growth -0.083 -0.107 -0.145 -0.083 -0.107 -0.145 
State Capacity 0.187* 0.181* 0.09 0.187* 0.181* 0.09 
Cold War -0.16** -0.209*** -0.172*** -0.16** -0.209*** -0.172*** 
Resources 0.021 
  
0.021 
  
Oil Price -0.093 
  
-0.093 
  
Conflict 
 
0.136 
  
0.136 
 
Global Test 19.733** 20.014** 20.914** 19.733** 20.014** 20.914** 
 
Table 29: Autocratic Linkage and Regime Survival, Four-year Lag 
 
Autocratic Breakdown, Four-year Lag 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Autocratic Linkage -1.236
***
 -0.285
**
 0.288 -1.236
***
 -0.285
**
 0.288 
 
(0.466) (0.139) (0.266) (0.466) (0.139) (0.266) 
Democratic Linkage 0.201
*
 -0.220 -0.144 0.201
*
 -0.220 -0.144 
 
(0.104) (0.184) (0.177) (0.104) (0.184) (0.177) 
Autocratic Distance 0.168
**
 0.204
**
 0.187
**
 0.168
**
 0.204
**
 0.187
**
 
 
(0.079) (0.091) (0.086) (0.079) (0.091) (0.086) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.314
*
 0.007 -0.413
*
 0.314
*
 0.007 -0.413
*
 
 
(0.167) (0.175) (0.246) (0.167) (0.175) (0.246) 
Global Autocracies -3.382
**
 -4.282
*
 -4.353
**
 -3.382
**
 -4.282
*
 -4.353
**
 
 
(1.559) (2.247) (1.699) (1.559) (2.247) (1.699) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.071 -0.158 -0.088 -0.071 -0.158 -0.088 
 
(0.096) (0.122) (0.101) (0.096) (0.122) (0.101) 
GDP Growth -0.054 -0.152 -0.116 -0.054 -0.152 -0.116 
 
(0.965) (1.031) (1.031) (0.965) (1.031) (1.031) 
State Capacity -41.105
**
 -39.007
**
 -60.483
***
 -41.105
**
 -39.007
**
 -60.483
***
 
 
(16.373) (16.142) (22.049) (16.373) (16.142) (22.049) 
Cold War 0.178 0.336 0.342 0.178 0.336 0.342 
 
(0.262) (0.321) (0.258) (0.262) (0.321) (0.258) 
Resources -0.683 
  
-0.683 
  
 
(0.530) 
  
(0.530) 
  
Oil Price 0.001 
  
0.001 
  
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.199
**
 
  
-0.199
**
 
 
  
(0.092) 
  
(0.092) 
 
Autocratic Linkage * ln(T) 
  
-0.194
*
 
  
-0.194
*
 
   
(0.104) 
  
(0.104) 
Black Knight Linkage * ln(T) 
  
0.162
*
 
  
0.162
*
 
   
(0.086) 
  
(0.086) 
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Autocratic Breakdown, Four-year Lag 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 1.739
***
 1.239 1.809
***
 1.739
***
 1.239 1.809
***
 
 
(0.499) (0.767) (0.553) (0.499) (0.767) (0.553) 
Events 206 170 203 206 170 203 
Observations 3,855 3,051 3,737 3,855 3,051 3,737 
Log Likelihood -927.106 -723.345 -907.184 -927.106 -723.345 -907.184 
LR Test 
39.173
***
  
(df = 12) 
27.171
***
  
(df = 11) 
34.820
***
  
(df = 12) 
39.173
***
  
(df = 12) 
27.171
***
  
(df = 11) 
34.820
***
  
(df = 12) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All 
covariates lagged by four years. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 30: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 29 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade  
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage 0.003 -0.035 -0.127** 0.003 -0.035 -0.127** 
Democratic Linkage 0.011 0.064 0.044 0.011 0.064 0.044 
Autocratic Distance -0.028 0.029 -0.041 -0.028 0.029 -0.041 
Black Knight Linkage 0.043 -0.069* 0.177** 0.043 -0.069* 0.177** 
Global Autocracies 0.172** 0.149** 0.186*** 0.172** 0.149** 0.186*** 
GDP per capita (ln) 0 -0.044 0.045 0 -0.044 0.045 
GDP Growth -0.061 -0.01 -0.112 -0.061 -0.01 -0.112 
State Capacity 0.153 0.11 0.078 0.153 0.11 0.078 
Cold War -0.085 -0.129* -0.09 -0.085 -0.129* -0.09 
Resources -0.001 
  
-0.001 
  
Oil Price -0.051 
  
-0.051 
  
Conflict 
 
0.051 
  
0.051 
 
Global Test 13.766 11.561 18.948** 13.766 11.561 18.948** 
 
Table 31: Autocratic Linkage and Regime Survival, Five-year Lag 
 
Autocratic Breakdown, Five-year Lag 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Autocratic Linkage -0.662 -0.293
**
 -0.119 -0.662 -0.293
**
 -0.119 
 
(0.410) (0.132) (0.186) (0.410) (0.132) (0.186) 
Democratic Linkage 0.210
**
 -0.299 -0.171 0.210
**
 -0.299 -0.171 
 
(0.099) (0.186) (0.214) (0.099) (0.186) (0.214) 
Autocratic Distance 0.146
*
 0.184
**
 0.193
**
 0.146
*
 0.184
**
 0.193
**
 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.088) 
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Autocratic Breakdown, Five-year Lag 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade 
(Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Black Knight Linkage 0.100 0.083 0.046 0.100 0.083 0.046 
 
(0.180) (0.116) (0.083) (0.180) (0.116) (0.083) 
Global Autocracies -0.827 -2.490 -5.458
***
 -0.827 -2.490 -5.458
***
 
 
(1.427) (1.685) (1.606) (1.427) (1.685) (1.606) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.105 -0.137 -0.087 -0.105 -0.137 -0.087 
 
(0.103) (0.120) (0.104) (0.103) (0.120) (0.104) 
GDP Growth -0.263 -1.378 -0.836 -0.263 -1.378 -0.836 
 
(1.249) (1.203) (1.331) (1.249) (1.203) (1.331) 
State Capacity -33.049
**
 -38.879
**
 -59.386
***
 -33.049
**
 -38.879
**
 -59.386
***
 
 
(13.805) (16.112) (22.809) (13.805) (16.112) (22.809) 
Cold War 0.465 0.595
*
 0.620
**
 0.465 0.595
*
 0.620
**
 
 
(0.301) (0.333) (0.278) (0.301) (0.333) (0.278) 
Resources -0.794 
  
-0.794 
  
 
(0.535) 
  
(0.535) 
  
Oil Price 0.001 
  
0.001 
  
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.162
*
 
  
-0.162
*
 
 
  
(0.088) 
  
(0.088) 
 
Global Autocracies * ln(T) 
  
2.042
***
 
  
2.042
***
 
   
(0.548) 
  
(0.548) 
Events 203 170 201 203 170 201 
Observations 3,797 3,051 3,736 3,797 3,051 3,736 
Log Likelihood -914.725 -723.522 -895.644 -914.725 -723.522 -895.644 
LR Test 
26.494
***
 (df 
= 11) 
26.403
***
 (df 
= 10) 
37.692
***
 (df 
= 10) 
26.494
***
 (df 
= 11) 
26.403
***
 (df 
= 10) 
37.692
***
 (df 
= 10) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Linkage 
indicators are standardised total and average trade volumes as a GDP share, standardised total and average 
migration per capita, and standardised total and average diplomatic exchange per capita. All covariates lagged 
by five years. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01 
 
Table 32: Proportional Hazards Test, Table 31 
 
Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade (Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
Autocratic Linkage -0.007 -0.089 -0.094 -0.007 -0.089 -0.094 
Democratic Linkage -0.002 0.082 0.01 -0.002 0.082 0.01 
Autocratic Distance 0.027 0.01 -0.039 0.027 0.01 -0.039 
Black Knight Linkage 0.054 -0.02 -0.052 0.054 -0.02 -0.052 
Global Autocracies 0.09 0.143* 0.161*** 0.09 0.143* 0.161*** 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.048 -0.065 0.022 -0.048 -0.065 0.022 
GDP Growth 0.036 0.063 0.028 0.036 0.063 0.028 
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Trade  
(Sum) 
Migration 
(Sum) 
Diplomatic 
(Sum) 
Trade (Mean) 
Migration 
(Mean) 
Diplomatic 
(Mean) 
State Capacity 0.156 0.138 0.097 0.156 0.138 0.097 
Cold War 0.054 -0.041 -0.023 0.054 -0.041 -0.023 
Resources 0.06 
  
0.06 
  
Oil Price 0.05 
  
0.05 
  
Conflict 
 
-0.039 
  
-0.039 
 
Global Test 16.77 10.492 20.616** 16.77 10.492 20.616** 
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